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POLICY

PROGRAMME IMPLEMENTATION

Role of UNDP in the 1990s

Indicators for national capacity-building

SUMMARY

This report has been prepared in accordance with Governing Council decision 89/20 of 30 June 1989, which requested the Administrator to make proposals for designing indicators to assess progress in the strengthening of national capacity for self-reliant development. The proposals for continuing the work initiated in 1989 are contained in section VI of the paper. Preceding sections review general issues in measuring national capacity and identify the development of institutional capacity as an issue of critical concern. The report recognizes that methods of assessing progress do exist at the level of individual institutions. It goes on to direct attention to the need to develop methods of identifying aggregate institutional capacity. The prospects of developing a national self-reliance index are discussed. Finally, the report points out the need to provide national managers with a set of indicators to assess progress in developing policy-making capacity in a wide variety of institutional settings.

I. BACKGROUND

1. Since its inception four decades ago, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and, for that matter, all the specialized agencies of the United Nations system, have been directed by their respective governing bodies to place primary responsibility on the provision of technical assistance to developing countries in enhancing national capacity for economic and social development at the macro, sectoral and regional levels.

2. UNDP in particular has been mandated to support national capacity-building for self-reliance, or more specifically, to promote increasing self-reliance in the developing countries with regard to the managerial, technical, administrative and research capabilities required to formulate and implement development plans and policies.

3. In pursuance of the above mandate of UNDP, the Governing Council, in paragraph 5 of part I of decision 89/20, requested the Administrator to make proposals for designing indicators to assess progress in the strengthening of national capacity for self-reliant development. This exercise is expected to bring benefits at two levels: (a) to contribute to policy analysis in this field; (b) to improve the work of UNDP. The first of these two aspects, i.e., the measurement of national capacity so as to enable national managers to make allocative decisions (of available resources, including technical co-operation) will help UNDP programming to be more effective and efficient.

4. Both in the area of progress indicators for national development and in the area of capacity-building, much theoretical work exists. Over the course of the year, work undertaken in response to the Council's request has set the framework for determining what might be appropriate directions of research for UNDP to present as proposals. Four separate activities were organized. First, an expert group undertook the task of establishing possible alternative frameworks for investigations in this field. Second, a paper was commissioned which examined the subject from an institutional perspective. Third, a separate paper on national indicators for self-reliant development was developed. And finally, a literature search was undertaken to determine the extent of work done by United Nations agencies and elsewhere in this field. The results of the investigations and proposals for further work required are presented in this paper.

II. AN ENABLING ENVIRONMENT AND BUILDING CAPACITY

5. A working definition of "national capacity for self-reliant development" for the purposes of measurement, must include economic, social, institutional, technological, political and human resource dimensions. These six dimensions interact to produce an enabling environment that promotes production and efficiency. They subsume a capacity for efficient resource development and use for sustainable growth, a capacity to distribute equitably the benefits of growth, a capacity to sustain national values in the process of growth and a capacity to participate in the world community.

6. Among the important components that sustain this enabling environment are: institutional capacity (public, private and collective institutions), human resource development and political leadership. In the discussion that follows, institutional capacity will be identified as critical to the concerns of this paper. Institutional capacity exists at three levels and includes: (a) the social systems and norms of a country; (b) the aggregate complex of development-oriented organizations (governmental and non-governmental); and (c) the individual capacity of any one organization in (b). The first category refers to socio-cultural and political systems, norms and traditions that guide individual and group behaviour. Economic relations, markets and legal systems, the control and use of assets such as land and water are central determinants of this view of institutional capacity. For the purposes of this study, however, institutional capacity is used in an organizational sense, covering public and private governmental and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Measuring the institutional capacity of a country in terms of development-related organizations would, therefore, be based on the development goals of the country. What kind of organizations, in what forms, are required to achieve which goals? This approach in no way diminishes the significance of the other five dimensions of development. Furthermore, measuring the progress achievable by nations along some of these dimensions has had significant theoretical and practical attention paid to it in many parts of the United Nations system, including UNDP.

7. This paper, therefore, will briefly review the progress made in developing indicators to measure national capacity in economic, human and technological dimensions. It will also discuss the state of the art in the measurement of institutional capacity and will then make proposals for important continuing research work in this area. This paper has benefited from inputs from United Nations agencies and outside experts.

III. NATIONAL CAPACITY AND SELF-RELIANCE

8. In this section, two issues are briefly discussed. The first is that even well-known indicators have to be used with care and in context. The second is that self-reliance, although a crucial aspect of development, is not easy to define nor to measure. The familiar ratio of foreign to indigenous inputs, for example, is only a partial measure of self-reliant achievement.

9. A national self-reliance index. Probably the most straightforward way to measure progress towards capacity for self-reliant development is to establish ratios for national development programmes of nationally provided capacity to externally provided inputs. Capacity in this context refers to human, financial, technical and managerial resources. Ratios to be developed would relate to the number of nationals versus expatriates in the labour force; to the amount of nationally generated funds versus the amount of grants and loans; to the value of external technical assistance relative to gross national product (GNP) or GNP per capita; and to the number of nationals versus expatriates in management positions.

10. While this information would be relatively simple and inexpensive to collect and maintain, its use would be very limited and confined to (a) broad goal-setting

when dealing with capacity-building objectives in the context of a development strategy and (b) making macro-level comparisons between countries. More in-depth work would be needed for deriving operational indicators which offer opportunities to develop concrete policies and strategies to build national capacity. UNDP proposes to examine the measurement of self-reliant development more closely.

11. The concept of national capacity for self-reliant development has rightly pre-occupied nations, especially in the developing world. The translation of this concept into a set of measurable indicators raises a range of interesting issues, many of which merit further research. The first issue which must be addressed is whether the indicators are to measure potential or outcomes. For example, the ratio of primary school teachers, classrooms, desks and textbooks to the numbers of children enrolled in primary schools is a measure of the capacity of the primary school system to deliver education; the proportion of children entering primary school who leave with basic numeracy and literacy is the outcome, and the relationship between the former and the latter is an indication of the effectiveness of the primary school system. The measurement of insputs is in general more easily and accurately carried out than the measurement of outcomes, but to assess effective capacity requires that both be known with some reliability. With respect to certain other indicators, the issue is more complex, and is more related to the time horizon over which the indicator is being monitored: for example, measures of national output, GNP or gross domestic product (GDP).

12. Measures of total output (GNP or GDP) are at first glance a measure of outcomes, since they represent the sum of all output produced in a country (i.e., GDP) or the sum of all output produced by nationals of a country (i.e., GNP). However, if these measures are examined over a very short period, they may reflect potential rather than achievement. Output is being produced which can be used either for the benefit of society, such as the construction of schools or food-processing plants, or for its detriment. If this indicator is to capture economic outcome as well as potential, then one solution is to consider only medium- or long-term GNP or GDP movements, since an economy in which socially unproductive activities are given prominence is not likely to sustain its increase in GNP or GDP.

13. The exception to this is an economy in which extra resources are continuously generated by a set of natural resources in circumstances of favourable world market conditions. Even though the identification of and exploitation of natural resources requires skill, technology, etc., there is an important sense in which the growth may be in part attributable to fortune. A method of separating the effects of fortune from those of effort is not immediately obvious, but if the focus is on rates of change of the indicator, then fortune is unlikely to account for consistent long-term increases, since it is likely to be a fluctuating rather than a reliable and sustained phenomenon.

14. In the medium and longer term, increases in any economic variables have in general been brought about by a combination of productive investments (including education and health) and technical progress. Similar arguments concerning time horizons must apply to development in any sphere, i.e., that the measurement be

carried out over a sufficiently long period of time to indicate sustainability and that the focus should be on the way in which the indicators change over time.

15. Secondly, while self-reliance is central to the process of nation-building, it does not lend itself easily to being considered an indicator of national capacity, since to some extent, its achievement is reflected more in attitudes: national pride, national cohesiveness and cultural values. Self-reliance also has very different meanings for small countries, with populations of less than 1 million, than for larger countries; even in the latter cases, however, the degree of international interdependence regarded as desirable has changed significantly over time.

16. Self-reliant development is furthermore concerned with a set of choices and trade-offs, since self-reliance is in general achieved at an economic cost. For example, attention to regional equality (within a country) may lead to a distribution of resources which is not the most efficient from the viewpoint of economic growth, but its achievements in terms of national integration may be considered worthwhile. Then, a nation which has placed self-reliance as its primary objective may experience less economic development than another which gives more priority to economic growth. To aggregate such achievements requires a weighing of the relative merits of different political and national values, which is not a technical exercise. Although the decision is ultimately a political one, and must always reflect the historical and cultural processes in particular countries, it is important that the resource costs of particular choices are known.

17. The index could also encompass measures of human resource flows involving both changes in the degree to which national institutions rely on international expertise, and the changes over time in the level of net outmigration of highly skilled and professional labour. This element would also involve an analysis of the changing extent to which highly skilled and professional labour is being trained domestically and abroad, and the training in one country of students from elsewhere.

18. Research into this area could be useful in further clarifying the issues. However, much of it can only be examined over the long run, since the absence of attention to self-reliance may over time produce socio-political forces which ultimately negate economic achievements.

IV. INDICATORS OF CAPACITY - A GENERAL DISCUSSION

19. A working definition of national capacity for self-reliant development for the purposes of measurement must include economic, social, institutional, political, technological and human resource dimensions. Briefly, these dimensions can be described as follows:

(a) Indicators of development which include economic and social, as well as human resource development. Technological, cultural and political dimensions can also be included, although technological development will to an important extent be reflected in economic development and in the development of human resources;

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cultural and political dimensions, however, do not lend themselves to clear-cut, unambiguous methods of measurement;

(b) Elements of institutional capacity, involving human, financial, material, technical and managerial resources. A central dimension of institutional capacity is concerned with the capacity for policy-making, policy implementation, policy analysis and review: although intangible, these have frequently proved to be the key to successful processes of social transformation. The major concern of UNDP has been with capacity-building, which does not lend itself to output measurement, since it is an activity rather than outcome. The focus here, however, will be on institutional capacity, as the intended outcome of capacity-building activities. In measuring institutional capacity, it is necessary to address the issue of aggregation. It is possible to assess the effectiveness of an institution in terms of the criteria set for that institution; what is more difficult is to assess whether the existence of any given institution is warranted, in the light of the severe public sector resource constraints which have increasingly come to condition government policy in all areas. Furthermore, the issue arises of how to add up institutional performance: in all societies, some institutions perform well, some less well, and although it is possible to assess each institution individually, it remains problematic to arrive at an aggregate assessment of institutional capacity as a whole. While qualitative judgements can be used and institutional development has been used in evaluating institutional development, quantitative indicators have yet to be developed;

(c) Technological capacity must be an important dimension of national capacity, whether this refers to the capacity to undertake original research; the capacity to adapt and modify techniques to the specific conditions prevailing in particular countries; the capacity to diffuse techniques from one sector or branch of production to another; or the capacity to introduce new techniques in the productive activities of a country.

Indicators of development

20. Much work has been undertaken on this topic by a range of United Nations agencies, other multilateral agencies including the World Bank, and by academics in all of the social sciences. The United Nations Statistical Office, for example, has produced a Handbook on Social Indicators, the Statistical Commission of the Economic and Social Council has adopted a number of reports on social statistics and indicators of development. The Administrative Committee on Co-ordination task force on long-term development objectives adopted in September 1989 a list of development indicators regarded as desirable for monitoring economic and social development, including indicators of child welfare, poverty reduction, the advancement of women, the environment and endogenous capacity-building in science and technology (see annex).

21. The forthcoming Human Development Report produced by UNDP will include a human development index, a composite index of different aspects of human welfare, including life expectancy, education, and the command over the resources needed to secure the necessities of life.

22. It is not possible to resolve the debate concerning the appropriateness of any one indicator of development. However, there has been much work on this, and there have been many attempts to examine the extent to which indicators are correlated with others, to enable the use of summary, or proxy indicators, as well as attempts to construct hybrid indicators which combine a variety of different measures. One example of a hybrid indicator is the physical quality of life index, which aggregated three simple indicators with equal weights: life expectancy at age one, infant mortality and literacy. Such a hybrid indicator raises the problem of the arbitrariness of the weighting, and also the issue of what is to be gained from a composite indicator compared with the use of the various component indicators. The United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, for example, argues that infant mortality is assumed to be a good indicator of the availability of sanitation and clean water facilities. While literacy is a good general measure of progress in education, the percentage of the relevant age group enrolled in primary school is included to measure country effort. Input measures have also been identified for water supply and sanitation as supplementary measures. It has not been possible, however, to identify a satisfactory measure of housing needs. The only readily available indicator is people per room, but this does not capture much of the quality of housing, only the number of rooms, which in turn, is a very rough index of crowding.

23. If an acceptable system of weights could be developed, it would be possible to combine such core indicators into a composite basic needs index. The chances of an acceptable system of weights being developed, however, are extremely small. Future research may be better directed towards developing more accurate data on existing indicators, on separating more clearly the input, outcome and institutional dimensions of these indicators, and on refining proxy indicators, i.e., those which capture a range of improvements in living conditions.

24. Furthermore, in the context of national capacity-strengthening, there is room for the development of more resource-efficient methods of collecting, analysing and utilizing data by a more direct focus on policy issues. For example, under the project Social Dimensions of Adjustment (RAF/86/037), UNDP is attempting to support the development of a social audit as a policy tool in the social sectors: data would be gathered on capital stock (buildings, equipment, etc.), human resources (levels of skills, output of training institutions, etc.), equipment and supplies, and would be combined with an assessment of needs, based largely on demographic data. This tool, using data frequently available at local levels, which does not rely on expensive household surveys, can make an important contribution to the formulation of medium- and long-term social policy. Further avenues of future development include the more effective utilization of existing data, and the greater pooling and dissemination of existing information.

V. INDICATORS OF INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT

25. This area has received much less attention than indicators of economic and social development, partly because of the inherent difficulties of arriving at measurable concepts. For a given institution, institutional capacity can be broken down into three elements, i.e., delivery (the institution's output), resources (the

institution's inputs), and the "condition" (the institution's collective moral values, leadership, commitment, etc.). The constituent elements can then be developed into a matrix which will permit systematic analysis of the capacity of an institution to define its operational objectives. Performance can then be tested against this standard. Performance can also be tested against external standards, especially its impact on socio-economic change. Here there is a wide variety of standards, varying from psychological benefits to the societal contributions of the institution. A variety of qualitative and quantitative indicators exist to measure capacity at the single institutional level.

26. In judging performance, however, it is crucial to distinguish between efficiency, effectiveness and impact on development. For example, an institution could be efficiently producing graduates not useable by the country, hence it is not effective. Effectiveness, therefore, relates to policy objectives; which in turn, require such capacity to be built into an institution. Impact, in turn, requires national capacity to use outputs for a social and economic purpose.

27. Although it is possible to envisage further developments along these lines, in terms of assessments of the effectiveness of institutions in delivering services, several issues have arisen as a result of the policy reforms undertaken in large numbers of developing countries via structural adjustment programmes. In large part, the circumstances in which structural adjustment has emerged have been characterized by the expansion of the public sector in many developing countries far beyond the taxable capacity of the economy; structural adjustment has therefore entailed drastic curtailment of the activities of the public sector. To some extent, this has involved the closure of institutions which may have been performing adequately, if judged on their own terms. However, a central question which this latter approach does not address is whether this institution should continue to exist, given the pressure of competing claims on limited public sector resources. Any approach to institutional capacity must then involve some conception of the economic costs of the output of the institution, and an assessment of whether, given these costs, the value to society of this output merits its continued existence. This involves the following questions: can the output of the institution be purchased from abroad without damage to future economic/technological capacity? What institutional arrangements are most effective in delivering the service - public sector, private sector or hybrid forms involving sub-contracting arrangements between the two? What should be the limits of market or competitive forces in the allocation of resources to institutions?

28. In this area, either benchmark prices or productivity ratios available internationally enable some comparison of the level of efficiency of such institutions; however, in many areas there are no clear-cut standards of comparison, for example in railway transportation. Furthermore, in all cases the issues are pervaded by political judgements concerning the respective roles of the market and the public sector, and the limitations which are to be imposed on financial incentives as the allocating principle, compared with the importance of social values such as public service morale and commitment, social responsibility, etc.

29. Two conclusions arise from the above. First, further research is needed into the comparative experience of different countries in the form in which public goods are provided, and the effects of these different forms. For example, there are wide variations in the institutional forms of delivery of health care, involving different combinations of public, private commercial, private NGO/non-commercial, with and without health insurance. The nature, functioning and effects of these different institutional forms on the health of the population, the access of the mass of the population to health care, etc., are vital areas of inquiry, which will indicate the systematic connections between differences in institutional arrangements and differences in outcomes.

30. The second conclusion is the importance of financial transparency: decisions concerning institutional arrangements are rarely made on the basis of economic considerations alone: the decision of whether or not to maintain the national airline will not be made according to its budgetary cost; however, the decision must always be informed by this cost, and in general, some form of benchmark prices are available, which provide an indication of the resource cost of particular forms of institutional arrangements.

31. By combining these two conclusions, it may be possible to answer questions such as the following. How effective have existing health institutions proved to be in delivering health-care to the population? What has been the impact and economic cost of this health care delivery? How does this cost compare with alternative institutional arrangements? How far are those institutional arrangements associated elsewhere with different outcomes in terms of the distribution of access to health care?

32. Many institutions which contribute positively to social harmony, stability and progress do not produce tangible outputs nor services which are amenable to economic valuation. These include co-operatives, farmers' organizations, trade unions, etc. Such institutions by their very nature do not lend themselves to quantifiable indicators. They are, however, valuable policy-determining organizations. The development of techniques to assess the institutional health of such organizations, both individually and at the aggregate, national level, must rely in part on the work of NGOs, and in part on assessments of the legal framework which facilitates or hinders the development and diversity of such institutions.

33. In addition, certain central aspects of institutional capacity are inherently intangible, such as the capacity to undertake policy analysis, review and implementation. Their measurability is also limited because such capacities are generally diffused in research institutions and universities as well as located in government ministries. Just as with other aspects of institutional capacity, the assessment of each institution in terms of its own purposes is less problematic than an assessment of aggregate national capacity in these areas. The latter must involve, for example, the degree to which policy analysts, researchers and policy-makers interact constructively with each other; it must also involve an assessment of broader aspects of policy effectiveness which are not reflected in immediate and direct outcomes at the level of institutions, such as the degree to which the policy framework facilitates and supports dynamic, innovative private sector activities in areas consistent with overall macro-economic plans.

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34. The measurement of institutional capacity is also rendered difficult by national specificity. The particular institutional arrangements that prevail in each country are the result of unique historical development; unlike technology, their transfer is hazardous. Clearly, the examination of institutional arrangements in countries that have achieved sustained development in the economic and social spheres is extremely valuable and lessons may be derived from such research. However, any attempt at the straightforward transferability of institutions or the clear-cut adaptation to a different environment of arrangements successful elsewhere is an exercise fraught with problems. Measurement, too, if it is to be relevant, must find a way of combining useful generalizations with a regard for the specificities of particular countries. This may be most usefully explored at the subregional level: groups of countries which share some important features of their historical experience have differing institutional arrangements, and transferability may be considered more feasible within a subregional context. This is certainly a topic for further research.

Human resource flows

35. Ultimately, institutional capacity depends upon the level of skill, experience, commitment and the pattern of deployment of high-level labour. From the viewpoint of an individual institution, its labour turnover, i.e., its capacity to attract and retain skilled, professional and managerial staff is one measure of its effectiveness. For a nation, the capacity to produce, reproduce and effectively deploy skilled, professional, scientific and managerial labour is a key determinant of its institutional capacity. This lends itself to quantification: the proportions of the high-level labour force in key categories which are domestically trained, the numbers of such workers who emigrate, the proportions of such posts occupied by short-term or donor-funded long-term expatriates, all provide some indication of the nation's capacity for self-sustained institutional development. For example, large numbers of doctors may be trained in national medical schools, yet a significant proportion of them emigrate, thereby exacerbating the shortages of medical personnel, which are in turn filled by expatriates, funded by donors. The problem then is one of the relative unattractiveness of national health institutions, including the capacity to pay adequate salaries, rather than the capacity of training institutions to produce qualified personnel. In fact, because of the access which such persons have to the international labour market, it means that national capacity to train such persons is being judged to be satisfactory. This analysis must be undertaken on a net basis, since international flows of labour into and out of countries has contributed immeasurably to the development of many countries; however, a trend in the net outmigration of high-level labour does provide an indication of the overall institutional health of a nation.

VI. PROPOSALS FOR FURTHER WORK

36. It is clear, therefore, that while self-reliant national capacity in general and institutional capacity in particular are basically comprehensible phenomena, a set of practical and usable indicators to measure growth in either area is not yet available.

37. The Administrator, therefore, proposes that further work be developed on the following lines. The work will be both country-specific and conceptual.

38. At the level of individual organizations, attempts will be made to develop a simple set of indicators for use by a wide variety of institutions to judge impact, effectiveness and efficiency. While a great variety of techniques are available to help improve institutional tasks - derived from behavioural and engineering sciences, a set of indicators that measure the effect of an institution on its clients has yet to evolve.

39. At the national level, the aggregate contribution of a complex of institutions has to be studied. What is the minimal institutional level needed in a sector or subsector? How is this to be judged? When is external technical co-operation no longer needed in developing institutional capacity? When does a nation graduate to self-sufficiency in its organizational strength? The policy implications that can benefit from this inquiry will be addressed.

40. A third area to be further explored is the value of developing a national self-reliance index. While the concept has limits as to quantification, a more comprehensive attempt will be made to study this issue further and publish the results.

41. Another area is the development of capacity for policy-making. The elements of policy development/implementation capacity have been articulated by a UNDP-supported project within the Latin American Center for Administration and Development. It relates to the following specifics:

- (a) Capacities to produce timely, accurate, and relevant information: statistical data, policy-monitoring information and evaluation feedback;
- (b) Capacities to analyse information in formulating public policies;
- (c) Capacities for a proper definition of the public policy agenda;
- (d) Popular participation in public policy formulation;
- (e) Adequate institutional capacities for public policy development, implementation, monitoring and evaluation.

42. The basis for an assessment is whether the policies formulated are having the intended result and impact. Each of the above components contains organizational, institutional and resource elements which would be subject to assessment criteria, and used as indicators of adequacy or deficiency.

43. However, policy development and implementation are carried out by the entire machinery of government as well as the political process. Coverage of one sector would entail organizational, institutional and resource assessments of a wide range of institutions and institutional relationships at all levels of government. The situation is further complicated when policy formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation are carried out through separate sets of institutions. A

means of rapid assessment may therefore have to rely more on the observable than the measurable.

44. The four areas encompassing individual institutions, national strategies for institutional decision-making, self-reliance measures and efficiency in policy-making, will be the ongoing work of UNDP. Pending decisions on a central research budget for 1992-1996, preliminary work outlining research proposals and identifying countries for further study will be developed. In the mean time, tentative indicators and methodologies will be elaborated with specific reference to the countries being currently identified, with the participation of national institutions, local academic institutions and the United Nations system. To the extent feasible, these tentative indicators and methodologies will then be tested in these countries. The results will serve as a basis for the elaboration of more refined indicators and methodologies through further research and testing under the UNDP central research programme for 1992.

45. Considerable work is being undertaken by a wide range of United Nations agencies. A collaborative process will be developed to involve them in the research tasks ahead. Furthermore, within UNDP, a wide range of initiatives such as the Management Development Programme, the Special Action Programme for Public Administration and Management and other programmes will also produce data that will support the research. Ex-post institutional evaluation activity will also provide valuable inputs to the research process.

AnnexREPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LONG-TERM DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES ON
ITS EIGHTEENTH SESSION a/

(New York, 18-20 September 1989)

The list of development indicators as revised by the Task Force is given below. It was recognized that adequate data are not yet available in many countries for some of these indicators, but it was considered desirable to begin the collection and compilation of the necessary data.

<u>Area of focus</u>	<u>Indicator</u>
Aggregate production and inflation	Growth of domestic product Saving and investment as share of GDP Consumer price index
Trade and balance of payments	Growth of exports and imports of goods and non-factor services Current account balance as a share of GDP Terms of trade of developing countries Net flow of resources to/from developing countries
External debt	Ratio of debt service to exports of goods and non-factor services Ratio of debt to GNP Average interest rates paid by developing countries
Agriculture and food security	Growth of agricultural and cereal production Cereal stocks as a percentage of cereal consumption Calories, apparent consumption, per capita, per day Shares of developing countries in world agricultural production and trade Food price index
Industrial development	Share of developing countries in world industrial production Rate of growth of industrial production

<u>Area of focus</u>	<u>Indicator</u>
Population	Annual population growth Total fertility rate Life expectancy at birth Proportion of population using family planning methods Young age and old age dependency ratio Percentage of the population which is urban
Labour and employment	Employment levels in the modern sector Open unemployment Non-agricultural self-employed plus unremunerated family workers as a percentage of the labour force Minimum wages Industrial wages Construction wages
Education and health	First level enrolment ratio, male and female Proportion of students enrolled in scientific and technological subjects in higher education Percentage literate, 15 years of age and over, male and female Public expenditure on education as a percentage of GNP Numbers suffering from nutritional deficiency diseases (vitamin A, goitre, iron deficiency)
Child welfare	Infant mortality rate Child mortality rate Proportion of births with low birth weight Immunization rates of children against diseases
Poverty reduction	Life expectancy Number of undernourished people, total and children percentage of families below poverty line
Human settlements	Percent of population with reasonable access to water supply sanitation and waste disposal Average number of persons per room Rate of urbanization Per cent of population living in cities of over 1 million Ratio of housing costs to income

<u>Area of focus</u>	<u>Indicator</u>
Advancement of women	Female infant mortality rate Female primary and secondary school enrolment rates Expectation of life at birth, female and male Percentage of women in the labour force
Environment	Actual closed forest cover as a percentage of declared target Degraded cropland as a percentage of total cropland Degraded pastoral land as a percentage of total pastoral land Growth of energy production from renewable sources Percentage(s) of the population exposed to excessive levels of air pollution and freshwater pollution
Endogenous capacity-building in science and technology	Science and technology investment from government and non-governmental sources in priority national development programmes or sectors Proportion of scientists and technologists engaged in activities of direct relevance to national development objectives Imports of technology-intensive products as proportion of total domestic demand for technology-intensive products

Notes

a/ This information originally appeared in document ACC/1989/CRP.13.



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[POLICY]

PROGRAMME IMPLEMENTATION

IMPLEMENTATION OF DECISIONS ADOPTED BY THE GOVERNING COUNCIL
AT ITS PREVIOUS SESSIONS

Report of the President on the outcome of the informal
considerations foreseen by decision 89/20

Ad hoc group consultations on the role of the United Nations
Development Programme in the 1990s: first meeting, held on
12 February 1990

Note by the President of the Governing Council

I. BACKGROUND

1. By section IV, paragraph 2, of its decision 89/20 of 30 June 1989, the Governing Council established a consultation process in order to continue consideration of issues relating to the role of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in the 1990s. The Bureau of the Governing Council reviewed how best to undertake these consultations and concluded that it was desirable to conduct them in a very flexible manner, permitting any delegation to raise questions informally on matters of special interest to it. On the suggestion of some delegations, it was proposed that the first consultation should focus on section II of Council decision 89/20, relating to funding strategy for UNDP. In order to structure the discussion of the item, it was agreed to concentrate on that particular aspect of decision 89/20 without losing sight of its interrelationship with other subjects covered by the decision. It was also agreed that, if the deliberations on decision 89/20 were not concluded at the first consultation, appropriate arrangements for further consultations of the ad hoc group would have to be foreseen.

2. A number of delegations participated in the informal discussions, at which a number of important questions were raised. The informal consultations were considered to be a useful exercise, permitting delegations to exchange views on important matters affecting the future funding of UNDP. It was agreed to hold further informal consultations on the subject.

3. The Administrator and Associate Administrator participated in the discussions. They provided factual information and clarifications on a number of questions raised.

II. GENERAL RESOURCE LEVELS

4. A number of delegations from developing countries referred to the funding goal for UNDP proposed by the Administrator, reflected in section II of decision 89/20 (preamble and para. 3). The view was expressed that the Administrator's call for a doubling of the core income for the fifth programming cycle was in keeping with the technical co-operation needs of developing countries. The argument received strong support from developing countries.

5. A number of delegations from donor countries referred to the need to be realistic about prospects for resources in the fifth cycle. They referred to the past experience of an average growth rate in core resources of about 6 per cent per annum as a realistic basis for future estimates. Some delegations indicated that, owing to a variety of current difficulties, future growth rates might be less than 6 per cent. Given that situation, they considered it prudent to look for alternative sources of funding, without losing sight of the fact that core financing should remain the central goal of a funding strategy. Reference was also made to the trend towards increased non-core resources, possibly reflecting a lack of confidence in the current indicative planning figure (IPF) system, which is based on the concept of universality, neutrality and flexibility, and at the same time establishes that the developing countries themselves assign priorities based on their own national plans.

6. Delegations from developing countries considered it essential that substantially increased resources should be made available, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 44/211 of 22 December 1989, and Governing Council decision 89/20, section II, bearing in mind the specific and growing needs of developing countries and that recent developments in international relations might have an impact on resources available for development. Reference was made to the need for predictable, sustainable and substantial increases in contributions to the funding of core resources.

7. In response to questions raised by developing countries, it was pointed out by donor delegations that the lack of substantial growth in UNDP resources did not mean a lack of support for multilateralism. Some donor delegations referred to the relatively high proportion of multilateral funding in relation to their country's official development assistance.

III. ISSUES RELATING TO CENTRAL FUNDING

8. Reference was made to the role of UNDP as a central funding organization for technical co-operation provided by the United Nations system, which was reaffirmed by General Assembly resolution 44/211. The central funding role is considered an important function of UNDP in order to promote co-ordination and responsiveness to national priorities through the country programming process. It was pointed out that the concept of central funding had not yet been realized in overall terms. A delegate suggested that data might reveal that the concept of central funding is being more fully realized at the regional and country levels as compared with the global level.

IV. ISSUES RELATING TO CORE AND NON-CORE FUNDING

9. It was agreed that the main objective of the funding strategy must be the continued growth of core funding. It was also agreed that additional funding alternatives should be pursued to complement core funding. It was pointed out that core funding was a central feature of UNDP, providing assistance for country programmes and for the field presence of UNDP. It was suggested by some delegations that core resources could be increasingly used as seed money to attract resources under cost-sharing or other arrangements. The issue was therefore not core versus non-core, but rather core funding supplemented by non-core resources. Those non-core resources should meet the test of "additionality".

10. A number of delegations referred to the need to programme non-core resources, in accordance with the programming process established for core resources. One delegation, supported by others, also suggested that it might be useful to consider establishing a ceiling for non-core resources in relation to core resources.

11. A number of delegations suggested that it might be desirable to explore the reasons for the slow growth of, and the limited prospects for, core resources. Some delegations suggested that a link might exist between the IPF system with its current programming mechanisms of UNDP and the lack of funding. Some delegations also suggested that many country programmes lacked a clear focus and profile and failed to convince donors.

V. ISSUES RELATING TO NON-CORE FUNDING

12. It was noted that non-core arrangements involved resources earmarked for bilateral projects, which were therefore not additional resources in the total resource flow to developing countries. In order to attract those resources, UNDP found itself in a competitive environment, in which the comparative advantages of UNDP would have to play a major role. Some donor delegations suggested that UNDP should seek those resources on the basis of its ability to deal with development themes, including capacity-building, co-ordination, refugees and development, environment and development. Donor delegations pointed out that prospective non-core financing was directly tied to technical competence and the intrinsic merits of projects.

13. Concern was expressed by some delegations of developing countries that non-core arrangements might lead to a distortion of national priorities unless there was an appropriate link of those arrangements with national programmes. In that connection, subparagraph (d) of the annex to decision 89/20 was recalled. Reference was made by developing country delegations to cost-sharing arrangements as an important source of additional resources.

VI. OTHER ISSUES

14. Reference was made to the difficulty for UNDP to project an image that would attract public support. The view was expressed that there was a need for more visible impact of technical co-operation support by UNDP.

15. The President suggested that one might wish to bear in mind that increased support to UNDP represented an investment in the future of developing countries and would not only benefit the recipient countries, but also donor countries. Thus, support to UNDP represented more than altruism and reflected "enlightened self-interest".

16. Some delegations also pointed out that areas of inefficiency might exist at UNDP which needed to be identified as a possible reason for the reduced levels of contribution.

17. Reference was also made to the thematic approach to funding UNDP.



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POLICY

THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME IN THE 1990s

Elements for a funding strategy for the United Nations
Development Programme

Report of the Administrator

SUMMARY

The present report is submitted in accordance with paragraph 8 of part II of Governing Council decision 89/20 of 30 June 1989, by which the Council requested the Administrator to propose elements for a funding strategy for the United Nations Development Programme by June 1990.

The report recommends measures for assessing the prospective demand for UNDP resources on a regular basis. It highlights the importance of a development profile for UNDP in the 1990s and sets forth principles for determining needed increases in core programme resources. It also suggests that in order to maintain existing programme levels, core resources during the fifth programming cycle must be increased by at least 10 per cent. The report further proposes principles to guide the mobilization and programming of non-core resources within the context of expanded country programmes, so as to ensure that the additionality they provide fully supports the policy and expenditure priorities of Governments.

CONTENTS

	<u>Paragraphs</u>	<u>Page</u>
INTRODUCTION	1 - 3	4
I. ELEMENTS OF A FUNDING STRATEGY FOR UNDP: RATIONALE AND PURPOSES	4 - 5	4
II. THE SPECIFICITY OF UNDP ASSISTANCE	6 - 10	5
III. PROSPECTIVE DEMAND FOR UNDP ASSISTANCE	11 - 30	6
A. Technical co-operation: a growing need	11 - 12	6
B. Arrangements for assessing technical co-operation needs	13 - 16	6
C. Technical co-operation needs quantified	17 - 19	7
1. Maintaining programme levels in real terms	17	7
2. Matching technical co-operation with other types of assistance flows	18 - 19	8
D. Differentiating between various types of technical co-operation needs	20 - 30	8
1. Core resources	21 - 25	8
2. Non-core resources	26 - 30	9
IV. PROSPECTS FOR FUND RAISING	31 - 55	10
A. Past and current assistance trends: core and non-core resources	33 - 35	11
B. Future action: establishing a well-defined development and assistance profile	36 - 41	13
C. Promoting the growth of non-core resources	42 - 47	15
D. UNDP and multilateral financing institutions: opportunities for strengthened collaboration	48 - 52	16
E. Management services	53 - 55	19
V. THE IMPLICATIONS OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF RESOURCES FOR PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT	56 - 65	19
A. Core resources	56	19

CONTENTS (continued)

	<u>Paragraphs</u>	<u>Page</u>
B. Non-core resources and co-ordination	57 - 62	19
C. Programme levels and administrative costs	63	21
D. Burden-sharing and predictability	64 - 65	21
VI. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS	66 - 77	25
<u>Annex</u> . FUNDING DATA		29

INTRODUCTION

1. The present report has been prepared pursuant to paragraph 8 of part II of Governing Council decision 89/20 of 30 June 1989, by which the Council requested the Administrator to propose elements for a funding strategy for the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) by June 1990.

2. The annex to decision 89/20 elaborates this request further and suggests that the strategy should, among other things, refer to arrangements that will be made for:

(a) An analysis of the specificity of UNDP assistance and the Programme's role within the overall context of development assistance;

(b) An analysis of the prospective demand for UNDP technical co-operation and the prospects for raising funds to meet this demand; and

(c) An assessment of different types of resources and their implications for both the host country and UNDP.

3. The following discussion examines each of these three issues in turn.

I. ELEMENTS OF A FUNDING STRATEGY FOR UNDP: RATIONALE AND PURPOSES

4. During the past four decades, technical co-operation has increasingly become a systematically planned and managed process, reflecting the progress developing countries have made in establishing and strengthening their own overall development planning and management capacities. The basic elements of a funding strategy for UNDP-supported technical co-operation matches this trend.

5. The purposes such a funding strategy should help achieve are, essentially, threefold. It should assist in determining:

(a) The comparative advantages and strengths of UNDP in acting as intermediary between donors and recipient countries in meeting certain technical co-operation needs;

(b) The quantitative and qualitative dimensions of the resource needs to be met. And, in the same vein, the funding levels and growth rates that UNDP considers desirable and realistic;

(c) The prospects for mobilizing the required amount and type of resources, or, in other words, the factors that condition the demand for UNDP assistance and services, on the side of both the recipient countries and the donors.

II. THE SPECIFICITY OF UNDP ASSISTANCE

6. The 1990s are emerging as a decade during which the development dialogue will be marked by the easing of tensions between the super-Powers and the process of democratization and reform taking place all around the globe. The international community will have to address such issues as:

(a) How to go beyond the adjustments that marked the 1980s - adjustments to an unfavourable international climate, to debt burdens and falling commodity prices, and to inadequate domestic policies. In the 1980s, many Governments implemented major structural adjustment programmes, often at great social and political cost; they would now like to modify those programmes in a way that will protect and improve human development levels in the next decade;

(b) How to ensure both environmentally sound and sustainable development while expanding co-operation with the South. Strategies to alleviate poverty are critical since many choices are made by the developing countries out of a necessity for immediate survival;

(c) How to promote national development initiatives to ease the growing dualism within countries in terms of economic participation, thus reducing economic and social inequities and threats to national stability.

7. All this will characterize a decade where accelerated rates of economic growth will need to be combined with improved levels of human development. The attainment of this goal will entail difficult political choices. It will need the strengthening of national capacity for effective policy design and management of policy implementation. It may also require the decentralization of decision-making, a greater involvement of people in development and the encouragement of private and civic initiative in its largest sense. Another major concern from a human development perspective will, of course, be greater investment in building up human capabilities with full recognition of the significant contribution such investments, especially investments in female education, can make to accelerated overall development.

8. The 1990s are likely to witness further globalization of development trends in an increasingly interdependent world. Issues of poverty, environment, human development and the equitable distribution of economic opportunities can be best handled from a global perspective. The universality of its assistance and its world-wide network of field offices places UNDP in a most suitable position to facilitate and support global and national action in these areas.

9. The multilateral character and the neutrality of its assistance make it possible for UNDP fully to respect Governments' sovereignty in determining their own development needs and priorities and to provide assistance which complements that available from other sources in such a way that the balance Governments wish to establish between different developmental goals and objectives is maintained and strengthened. UNDP assistance is committed to the principle of national programming of external assistance, re-emphasized in General Assembly resolution 44/211 of 22 December 1989, and to promoting development in a comprehensive and

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integrated fashion, to marrying economic and social concerns, to linking shorter-term with longer-term action, to bringing together national, regional and global concerns, and, most importantly, to ensuring that development reaches its ultimate goal: the betterment of people's lives and a widening of their economic, social, cultural, and political opportunities and choices.

10. In sum, given the particular advantages and strengths of UNDP and its overall objective of human development, the Programme is especially well poised to respond to Government requests for technical co-operation in establishing requisite national capacity in three areas likely to be of highest developmental priority in the 1990s:

(a) Strategies for poverty alleviation and investment in people, to enhance their chances for fuller participation in productive income-generating processes, with particular attention to women in development;

(b) Better economic management in a competitive environment, to ensure maximum efficiency of resource allocation and the release of the creativity and productivity of all the people;

(c) Environmentally sound and sustainable economic growth, which encompasses the need to be concerned with the longer-term impact of current policies.

III. PROSPECTIVE DEMAND FOR UNDP ASSISTANCE

A. Technical co-operation: a growing need

11. It is thus quite evident that the demand for UNDP assistance is growing and will continue to grow. The 1990s have reinstated in the forefront of the development debate the concern for the ultimate goal of development - the betterment of people's lives. It is this goal which lies at the heart of the UNDP mandate and at that of the other United Nations system entities which function as executing or affiliated agencies of UNDP assistance.

12. Another factor which explains the expected upward trend in the need for technical co-operation, including UNDP assistance, is that development is a continuous process. The stock of existing knowledge and available technologies is constantly expanding, requiring further investments in human capacity-building, the sharing of information, and other new types of co-operation between developed and developing countries and among developing countries. This need is likely to grow even faster since knowledge-based technologies are rapidly gaining in importance as sources of more accelerated and durable future economic growth.

B. Arrangements for assessing technical co-operation needs

13. The UNDP country programming process as designed at present includes a number of arrangements that support the preparation by Governments of estimates of technical co-operation needs that are often country wide, including estimates of

current and future needs for UNDP assistance. In several countries, especially those in Africa, these needs assessments take the form of national technical co-operation assessments and programmes (NATCAPs); in other countries they follow a simpler but nevertheless systematic procedure.

14. Whatever their form, these assessments seek not only to identify existing technical co-operation needs but also to examine realistic ways of meeting them by establishing priorities among the various identified needs and examining related resource requirements, including those for national human resources. UNDP assistance in support of these needs assessments, especially the assessment methods and procedures which UNDP has helped to devise, have thus often performed the function of an honest broker - balancing technical co-operation needs with absorption capacity and with the amount of resources likely to be supplied by the donor community.

15. Technical co-operation needs assessments can form the basis for current assistance programming. Furthermore, to the extent that current programmes cannot cover all identified needs, these assessments can provide a country-level inventory, i.e., a pipeline, of assistance requests. If aggregated accordingly, they can also provide regional and global inventories of technical co-operation needs.

16. UNDP will continue to assist Governments in the preparation of assistance needs assessments, the importance of which was also stressed in paragraph 17 of General Assembly resolution 44/211. It will also strengthen its efforts to synthesize the findings of these assessments more systematically and to improve the availability of information thereon in order to assist recipient Governments and donors to achieve a fuller and better understanding of trends and patterns in the demand for, as well as the supply of, resources for technical co-operation.

C. Technical co-operation needs quantified

1. Maintaining programme levels in real terms

17. While it is possible in a general way to identify an upward trend in technical co-operation needs, a precise quantitative estimate is often difficult to establish. What can, however, be determined quite clearly is the amount of resources required to ensure that existing programme levels are maintained in real terms. The attainment of this funding objective requires that resources increase in line with existing rates of inflation. As discussed in the report of the Administrator on preparations for the fifth programming cycle and net contributor status (DP/1990/43), maintaining the fourth cycle programme level in real terms requires, if one assumes an inflation rate of 6 per cent, an annual growth in voluntary contributions of at least 10 per cent. ^{1/} However, this increase leaves little room for responding to expanded needs. If one takes into account the increasingly expanding and diversifying needs for technical co-operation, it could be concluded that maintaining existing programmes (i.e., not promoting new concerns at the expense of current ones) would require an increase in resource levels well beyond 10 per cent, with cautious estimates varying between 12 and 16 per cent.

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2. Matching technical co-operation with other types of assistance flows

18. One of the major lessons conveyed by experience is that a proper match between different types of assistance can help considerably to enhance the overall effectiveness of external assistance programmes.

19. It is, therefore, interesting to note that the aforementioned figure of a 10 per cent increase in resources required to maintain programme levels in real terms reflects a principle similar to the one recently agreed upon for the Replenishment IX of the International Development Agency (IDA). IDA provides capital assistance to the poorest nations of the world, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. These very countries need national capacity-building and technical assistance even more than capital assistance. Technical co-operation growth should, therefore, not be allowed to lag behind the growth in capital assistance.

D. Differentiating between various types of technical co-operation needs

20. Technical co-operation can help achieve several objectives - national capacity-building, better utilization of existing capacity, or direct advice and support are among the most important. It may be used in support of more established, regular development endeavours and it may be used for testing new approaches and launching new policy initiatives. Different needs often require different funding arrangements.

1. Core resources

21. General Assembly resolution 44/211 re-emphasizes the importance of a growth in UNDP core resources. It stresses:

"the value of the concept of central funding of technical co-operation through the United Nations Development Programme in order to promote co-ordination and responsiveness to national priorities through the country programming system and urges all Governments to channel the maximum possible share of resources available for multilateral technical co-operation through the United Nations Development Programme".

22. Both recipient and donor Governments clearly recognize the continuing importance of central funding, and hence of maintaining an effective level of core resources.

23. Over the past several years, however, there have been trends within the category of core resources indicating that more importance should be assigned to regional and interregional activities. There is also a growing need for Special Programme Resources (SPR). In view of the increasingly rapid change that marks the development process and its growing complexity, existing instruments and modalities

must be monitored and assessed for continuing relevance; appropriate responses to new concerns must be generated and practical policy experience and information must be shared among countries on more and more issues. There are also a large number of unforeseen events, such as natural disasters, which demand immediate response.

24. In the Administrator's view, which is also set forth in document DP/1990/43, a substantial increase in the fourth-cycle SPR level constitutes an urgently required response to this vast array of needs.

25. However, activities financed from the SPR should clearly be perceived as responding to global concerns, encouraging innovation, improving programme quality, or responding to unforeseen needs stemming, inter alia, from natural disasters. Whenever possible, they should, in due course, be mainstreamed, i.e., transferred from the SPR to the national, regional, interregional and global IPFs or other non-core resources.

2. Non-core resources

26. In its resolution 44/211, the General Assembly also recognizes the importance of non-core resources. This type of resources includes cost-sharing, trust funds and Government cash counterpart contributions (GCCC). The General Assembly emphasized that non-core resources can constitute important additionality:

"... provided they are designed as a means to ensure additional resource flows, and their projects are coherently and effectively integrated in the technical co-operation programmes of the United Nations system, in conformity with each country's national development plan and programme and in accordance with the respective mandates of programmes and organizations".

27. This stipulation can be met since the country programme is intended not only to reflect national priorities but also to serve as a framework for technical co-operation which goes beyond the programming of UNDP core resources. It can thus help guide the utilization of non-core resources, in particular that of cost sharing and GCCC, the two types of non-core resources which are usually directly linked to UNDP core funds. Trust funds are of a somewhat different nature in the sense that they may to a larger extent reflect donor priorities. More systematic technical co-operation needs assessments, their continuous updating, and the sharing of information thereon between Governments and their aid partners could, however, be one way of overcoming problems in this respect and encouraging a closer alignment of donor and recipient country priorities in the future. A further step into this direction would be the preparation of an expanded country programme, i.e., a programme which goes beyond the activities that will be supported from core resources.

28. Such an expanded country programme could have several advantages:

(a) It would allow the programming of core financing within the expanded country programme and the activities for which non-core financing is to be mobilized;

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(b) In its quest for additional resources over and above the indicative planning figure (IPF), the Government can refer to a programmed, cohesive package of technical co-operation needs formulated without any sectoral, bilateral or institutional bias; and

(c) It could function as a pipeline of available projects whenever there is a slack in core-funded activities.

Once donors see that non-core proposals form part of the country's technical co-operation priorities, resource mobilization efforts would benefit. UNDP can play an active role in co-operating with the Government's overall resource mobilization efforts, with the IPF being used at times as seed money, to be leveraged with non-core funding.

29. With an expanded country programme, discussions with donors on the development priorities and programmes to be addressed with UNDP co-operation should take place at an earlier stage than at project formulation. After all, rarely does the IPF cover the full technical assistance requirements of a given sector, but through multi-donor involvement, full sectoral programming could become the norm. For this reason alone, donors might wish to join such an expanded country programme from the start. They could either provide funding through one of the United Nations system non-core modalities or choose to finance and execute bilaterally. In the former case, UNDP would point to the added value of its non-core modalities and their strengthening of co-ordination at country level.

30. Undoubtedly, many of the development concerns ranking high on the development agenda of this decade could appropriately benefit from technical co-operation supported by non-core resources. They are often used as advocacy instruments on behalf of particular population groups, such as women or the rural poor, or in the interest of certain development goals, such as sound natural resource management. What was said for SPR-supported activities above could also apply to certain programmes and projects financed from non-core resources. Once their purposes are met or once they have become regular activities, these programmes and projects should also be mainstreamed, i.e., transferred to core-resource funding.

IV. PROSPECTS FOR FUND RAISING

31. Resource availability can be improved in a number of ways. One, of course, is the more cost-effective and efficient use of resources. Some recommendations to this effect are set forth in section II (paras. 16-23) of the annex.

32. However, the focus here will be more on raising additional funds. A first, but certainly only preliminary, indication of what is possible in this respect is provided by the past and current trends in UNDP funding.

A. Past and current assistance trends: core and non-core resources

33. As 95 per cent of its funding is provided by the multilateral component of the aid budgets of the member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC), UNDP depends on political decisions that affect an individual donor's aid volume as well as its respective bilateral-multilateral split. The trend of OECD/DAC multilateral Official Development Assistance (ODA) since 1962 is shown in chart 1, including the United Nations system share. As far as the future is concerned OECD/DAC pointed out that the outlook for aid volume trends is not encouraging; average annual increases in real terms of the order of 2 per cent is probably the most that can be expected. This, coupled with a multilateral share that seems to be stabilizing, and with grant contributions to the United Nations system being outpaced by the growth in contributions to the multilateral financing institutions, as shown in chart 2, sets the stage for the funding outlook of UNDP in the 1990s.

34. During the period 1979 to 1987, the UNDP share of ODA from OECD/DAC has slowly but steadily declined, as shown in chart 3, both in terms of UNDP core resources as well as for the UNDP grand total, i.e., UNDP core resources, administered funds and non-core resources. This global characteristic differs, however, for each OECD/DAC member country (see statistical table 1 of annex).

35. If the technical co-operation needs of the 1990s are to be met, especially those that would benefit from UNDP support, the declining trend in resource availability must be halted.

Chart 1. OECD multilateral ODA
(Percentage)




Chart 2. Distribution of multilateral ODA
(Billions of US dollars)





Chart 3. UNDP share of OECD ODA
(Percentage)



B. Future action: establishing a well-defined development and assistance profile

36. One measure that UNDP would have to take in this respect is to project a well-defined development profile: the specificity of its role, its major concerns and areas of competence must be clear to both donors and recipients alike.

37. As part of its funding strategy, UNDP must work on confidence-building. It must convey the message and provide the empirical proof that its assistance in the priority areas mentioned in paragraph 11 above is of the highest standards and that it is effective and efficient. This applies to the assistance rendered by UNDP or that rendered by any of the technical agencies involved, especially the United Nations system agencies.

38. Another measure that is of interest to resource mobilization relates to the fact that, over the past years, approaches that are increasingly theme-oriented have been adopted for development assistance, including technical co-operation. This is, among other things, evident from the growth of UNDP non-core resources and the increasing amount of United Nations system technical co-operation delivered by other United Nations system agencies, especially the technical agencies.

39. Trust funds of the United Nations system agencies increased from an annual average of \$35.0 million to \$200.0 million in the early 1970s, to \$450.0 million in 1988. Over this same period, UNDP has shown a steady growth in core contributions, in particular when measured in Special Drawing Rights (SDRs). 2/

40. Since the mid-1970s, the Administrator has, on the authority of the Governing Council, also sought a substantial increase in funds contributed under cost-sharing and trust fund arrangements, both from recipient and donor Governments and has accepted responsibility for administering funds created by General Assembly resolutions (the United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF), the United Nations Sudano-Sahelian Office (UNSO), the United Nations Fund for Science and Technology for Development (UNFSTD), the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), the United Nations Revolving Fund for Natural Resource Exploration (UNRFNRE), United Nations Volunteers (UNV) and the Special Measures Fund for the Least Developed Countries (SMF/LDC)). Both the administered funds and the cost-sharing modality are becoming increasingly visible, as illustrated in chart 5. 3/

41. The growth of non-core resources cannot simply be interpreted as a trend towards increasing non-core funding. It is also, if not first and foremost, an indication of donor interest in focused, clearly defined funding purposes. The same principle can be applied to core funding; its direction, effects and impact must be brought out more clearly.

Chart 4. UNDP core funds
(Millions of US dollars)





Chart 5. UNDP core and non-core funds
(Millions of US dollars)



C. Promoting the growth of non-core resources

42. Continuous non-core growth can be expected as long as:

(a) Middle-income countries continue to increase their non-core use of the UNDP central funding channel to finance what their small IPFs cannot carry;

(b) LDCs seek non-core resources because of the additionality they provide;

(c) Donors finance their non-core priorities using UNDP funding windows such as the environment (UNSO in sub-Saharan Africa); women in development and UNIFEM; support to LDCs; UNCDF; SMF/LDC and other special windows, including the SPR and other activities, either through programme or project cost-sharing, for poverty alleviation/grass-roots development, such as the UNDP/non-governmental organization (NGO) Partners in Development facility; the NGO Africa 2000 Network; and the Promotion of the Role of Women in Water and Environmental Sanitation Service (PROWESS);

(d) Donors and recipients agree that the use of UNDP services will provide an appropriate instrument for achieving priority development objectives.

43. At the corporate level, UNDP will undertake non-core resource mobilization in particular where the attainment of global priority concerns seems to require additional resources, i.e., a strengthening of the developmental efforts supported from core resources. Furthermore, UNDP will also actively promote packages, whereby non-core technical co-operation supports capital assistance from other sources. In addition, the wide range of execution modalities that UNDP has to offer - ranging from execution by agencies or by the Office for Project Services (OPS) to contracting NGOs and working through commercial channels - could be attractive to many Governments who may be interested in achieving certain developmental results through particular assistance modalities.

44. While UNDP core funding relies on a small number of major contributors, this is even more pronounced with the administered funds, as illustrated in table 1.

Table 1. Number of major donors and their combined percentage share of contributions, 1989

	<u>75-80%</u>	<u>50% or more</u>		<u>75-80%</u>	<u>50% or more</u>
UNDP core	10	6	UNV	3	1
UNCDF	6	3	SMF	2	1
UNIFEM	6	4	UNFSTD	2	1
UNSO	3	1	UNRFNRE	1	1

Source: UNDP.

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45. The Governing Council has reviewed the role and structure of the UNDP-administered funds several times. The funds today, UNCDF, UNIFEM and UNSO in particular, have operational expertise that can be utilized by both multilateral and bilateral funding sources. This had been done successfully already by several of the funds, over and above the implementation of their own programmes. Similarly, UNV is actively providing services for placing volunteers from developing and developed countries and promoting its Domestic Development Services.

46. Both UNCDF, with its emphasis on grant capital assistance for small-scale investments (\$0.2-\$5.0 million) and UNSO, with its emphasis on desertification control, are concentrating on LDCs. These two funds, as well as other trust funds and administered funds, including UNIFEM, can accept voluntary programme contributions and cost-sharing contributions for programmes and projects. The latter will also be sought through the Administrator's annual presentation to the Governing Council on non-core requirements for UNDP development themes. The UNDP-administered funds will also join the expanded country programming process, to ensure their integration into national priorities and become part of a wider effort in pursuit of non-core additionality. On NGOs, the specific initiatives under the Partners in Development funding and the micro-capital grants will also be promoted for special-purpose funding.

47. With the multilateral financing institutions showing greater interest in people-centered development approaches, with particular emphasis on women in development, UNCDF, UNIFEM and UNSO will be seeking greater collaboration with those institutions, and in particular with the World Bank/IDA. UNCDF could thus help IDA to have a local-level impact with its projects that are under \$5.0 million; UNIFEM can assist the World Bank in getting more women-in-development projects operational, while UNSO can do this for environmental issues in the Sahel countries.

D. UNDP and multilateral financing institutions: opportunities for strengthened collaboration

48. Of total ODA for technical co-operation (\$10.2 billion in 1988), the United Nations development system, with \$1.8 billion, ranks as the third largest source after the USA and France. No donor, however, equals its world-wide coverage; its technical co-operation grant disbursements alone equal 25 per cent of World Bank total disbursement: in 1988.

49. Of all United Nations system flows, including the World Bank's technical co-operation, UNDP is the largest source of grant financing; its disbursements amounted to \$916.7 million in 1988. Disbursements of the World Bank's free-standing technical assistance loans and credits rose to \$183.0 million in 1988, half of which were made in Africa; another \$150.0 million was provided in the form of consultants and training under IDA loans, 4/, mostly related to the implementation requirements of the investments the World Bank helps to finance. Overall, the World Bank reports its technical assistance volume as stagnant in the 1983-1988 period; during the same period, it was in decline as a percentage of annual loan commitments, from 7.5 per cent to 5.7 per cent. African Governments in

particular are often reluctant to borrow for their technical assistance requirements, favouring grants from other sources. 5/

50. In this respect, the Governing Council may wish to review whether the interest of the recipient countries would not be better served if the World Bank would either contract its free-standing technical assistance loans with UNDP, given the minor percentage (less than 1 per cent) they represent of what the Bank annually approves as commitments (approximately \$20.0 billion).

51. Such channelling would make these loans part of the UNDP world-wide management support capacity for technical co-operation and would help to reduce the number of funding channels the recipient has to deal with. 6/

52. Table 2 shows the non-ODA (i.e., International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)) component of the World Bank in decline, as well as a major reduction in ODA from the Arab Funds, both in terms of disbursements and as a percentage of commitments; IDA disbursements have stabilized; disbursements from regional banks, in particular the Asian Development Bank (AsDB) and the African Development Bank (AfDB), are growing, albeit still short of their commitment levels. Carrying loans without enjoying their benefits is, however, expensive, not only in administrative costs and interest charges but also in opportunity costs and inflation-driven price increases. This is also true for the European Economic Community (EEC) grants, which show low implementation rates. Again, involving the managerial in-country capacity of UNDP through a non-core modality could help improve the disbursement rates.

Table 2. Multilateral loan disbursements in millions of dollars and as a percentage of commitments

Year	Non-ODA		Official Development Assistance												Grants	
	World Bank		IDA	AsDB		AfDB		IDB		IFAD		Arab funds		EEC		UN
	\$	%	\$	\$	%	\$	%	\$	%	\$	%	\$	%	\$	%	\$
1970	585	39	225	-	-	-	-	219	50	-	-	-	-	208	224	371
1975	1 768	45	1 198	72	43	-	-	299	52	-	-	288	111	611	126	1 199
1980	3 166	38	1 543	149	31	96	35	326	40	54	14	286	68	1 061	68	2 187
1985	5 041	39	2 599	393	51	210	48	351	140	270	181	133	46	1 407	113	2 335
1987	3 417	24	3 530	540	37	374	49	121	40	336	257	73	25	1 747	45	2 998
1988	3 417	24	3 567	660	60	351	46	134	112	102	41	60	10	2 743	57	3 457

Source: OECD/DAC.

E. Management services

53. The concept of management services refers to the provision by UNDP of management and other support services at the request of a recipient Government. These services are provided for projects financed by bilateral donors or from loans by multilateral financing institutions. The modality is geared to assisting the requesting recipient Governments to utilize such resources for specified purposes, which may range from the formulation of projects to their implementation and procurement of project inputs.

54. The provision of management services should not be seen as an instrument for mobilizing additional resources. While the modality serves to amplify and reinforce support provided by UNDP, and often strengthen its role in the country, it does not per se constitute a mechanism for augmenting the UNDP resource base. Funds pertaining to management services are accounted for separately by UNDP and are not treated as UNDP resources. This differs from the arrangement followed by the United Nations agencies, which report such activities as part of their non-core disbursements.

55. The role, functions and activities of OPS in respect to management services have been addressed in the report of the Administrator on the review of the experience gained in the provision of management services (DP/1990/67), submitted to the Governing Council at its current session. The role of OPS is limited to that of assisting recipient Governments to utilize aid resources other than those of UNDP; thus, OPS operations in this regard are independent from the volume of the resource base of UNDP, and should not be viewed as relevant elements in the UNDP strategy to augment its resources.

V. THE IMPLICATIONS OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF RESOURCES FOR PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

A. Core resources

56. The stated purpose of UNDP country programming is that, above all, it facilitates country-specificity and responsiveness to the Governments' own priorities. The slower growth in UNDP core resources and the increased volume of non-core resources channelled through UNDP and other United Nations system agencies has given rise to growing concern about integrated and co-ordinated planning and the use of United Nations system assistance programmes at the country level.

B. Non-core resources and co-ordination

57. Decisions taken by both donor and recipient Governments have eroded the principle of central funding, prompting the United Nations system to respond with tailored execution modalities to satisfy donors' special interest funding. 7/ The result has been that the delivery of United Nations system inputs has become increasingly complex. This recently prompted the General Assembly, in its resolution 44/211, to stress that: "co-ordination in funding arrangements and

/...

procedures of the operational activities for development of the United Nations system should minimize the administrative and financial burden on recipient Governments", and also to stress "the value of the concept of central funding of technical co-operation through the United Nations Development Programme in order to promote co-ordination". 8/

58. In addition, the OECD/DAC 1989 Report entitled Development co-operation in the 1990s recently pointed out that: the scattering of funds in extrabudgetary contributions continues to be a problem and reflects a degree of inconsistency with the view of multilateral aid which donors themselves profess.

59. The issue of trust funds is not one of volume only; as indicated by consultants to the Director-General 9/, it also involves the development strategies and plans of recipient countries as well as the latter's ability to carry them out in the manner they consider most appropriate. Agencies were quoted as stating that special purpose funds are established largely on the basis of donor wishes and based on resources that would not otherwise, in any case, have gone to the UNDP core resources.

60. Furthermore, the report notes the comments of donors: none had difficulties in identifying UNDP with the central funding role. They stressed that they continued to pledge substantial resources to UNDP core. Some donors pointed out that there were clear limits to the possibilities of growth in their voluntary contributions.

61. The real choice for the donors, however, is not between trust funds with the agencies or core funding with UNDP, but between trust funds with the agencies or non-core funding with UNDP. The latter has, in particular at the country level, the advantages of:

- (a) Conforming to national priorities;
- (b) Reducing the multiplicity of channels, thus freeing up recipient management capacity and reducing administrative costs;
- (c) Using UNDP managerial capacity already in place, thus reducing administrative costs;
- (d) Combining with some UNDP core financing, thus confirming the project's priority status.

62. As stated by the recipients themselves, UNDP's core i.e., IPF funds rank highest among United Nations system technical co-operation funding, as they carry no conditions. This also holds true, of course, for non-core resources provided by the recipient Government itself to fund United Nations system technical co-operation activities totally integrated into the country's national development priorities. By contrast, donors' non-core funding often influences recipient Governments' policies and priorities, to the extent that donor Governments decide beforehand on the programmes and projects for which their funds will be allocated. As discussed before, such effect can, of course, be overcome, if a broader net is cast when programming the country's technical co-operation requirements.

C. Programme levels and administrative costs

63. UNDP continues to monitor the relationship of programme levels and non-core administrative costs, and is satisfied that non-core activities are not financed from the UNDP core budget.

D. Burden-sharing and predictability

64. Governing Council decision 89/20 of 30 June 1989 makes reference to the issues of burden-sharing ^{10/} and the predictability of core volume flows. This was last reviewed in detail during the deliberations of the Intersessional Working Group of the Whole (DP/1983/ICW); after considering the available options, the Council took no decision other than to recommend that Governments make multi-year pledges. Summary characteristics of each of the available options are presented in section I.A of the annex.

65. Current burden-sharing among the major contributors to UNDP is illustrated in table 3, which compares percentage shares of 1989 core income with the 1989 percentage shares under the United Nations assessment scale. Table 4 singles out those countries with specially noticeable performance. In this respect, it should be noted that growth in UNDP core funding would undoubtedly benefit if contributions from the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and France were more in line with their share of the world economy. If this does not happen, burden-sharing could well become a dominant issue in the nineties; other major donors with smaller economies might be motivated to further diversify into non-core modalities, thereby weakening everything that the core represents. This process seems already under way when one compares the core and non-core growth rates in the last decade, in particular those of the United Nations agencies (see also sect. I.A. of the annex).

Table 3. United Nations assessment scale and percentage share
of UNDP core funding, 1989

<u>Countries</u>	<u>UNDP</u>	<u>UN</u>
<u>OECD</u>		
USA	11.68	25.00
Sweden	9.21	1.21
Japan	8.76	11.38
Italy	8.21	3.99
Norway	8.00	0.55
Denmark	7.62	0.69
Netherlands	7.58	1.65
Germany, Federal Republic of	7.27	8.08
Canada	5.86	3.09
France	4.61	6.25
United Kingdom	4.53	4.86
Finland	3.74	0.51
Switzerland	3.53	1.08
Belgium	1.68	1.17
Australia	1.35	1.57
Austria	1.03	0.47
Spain	0.67	1.95
New Zealand	0.15	0.24
Turkey	0.08	0.32
Ireland	0.05	0.18
Greece	0.04	0.40
Portugal	0.03	0.18
Luxembourg	0.01	0.06
Iceland	0.01	0.03
<u>CMEA</u>		
USSR	0.32	0.99
Hungary	0.08	0.21
German Democratic Republic	0.06	1.28
Romania	0.05	0.19
Bulgaria	0.05	0.15
Czechoslovakia	0.03	0.66
Poland	0.02	0.56

Table 3 (continued)

<u>Countries</u>	<u>UNDP</u> %	<u>UN</u> %
<u>OPEC/Arab countries</u>		
Saudi Arabia	0.37	1.02
Kuwait	0.06	0.29
Algeria	0.06	0.15
Nigeria	a/	0.20
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	a/	0.69
Iraq	a/	0.12
Libya	a/	0.28
Qatar	0.02	0.05
United Arab Emirates	0.03	0.19
Venezuela	0.09	0.57
Oman	0.01	0.04
Bahrain	b/	0.02
Syria	0.01	0.04
<u>OTHERS</u>		
<u>Countries contributing</u> <u>\$1.0 m or over</u>		
India	0.51	0.37
China	0.27	0.79
Brazil	0.26	1.45
Cuba	0.15	0.09
Colombia	0.13	0.14
Thailand	0.11	0.10
Indonesia	0.12	0.15
Pakistan	0.11	0.06
Mexico	0.11	0.94
Sri Lanka	0.10	0.01
Republic of Korea	0.10	0.30
<u>GNP per capita</u> <u>\$1,500 or over</u>		
Chile	0.09	0.08
Malaysia	0.04	0.11
Uruguay	0.03	0.04
Jordan	0.02	0.01
Barbados	0.01	0.04

/...

Table 3 (continued)

<u>Countries</u>	<u>UNDP</u> %	<u>UN</u> %
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	0.02	0.05
Brunei Darussalam	0.01	0.02
Singapore	0.01	0.11
Argentina	a/	0.66
Bahamas	a/	0.46
Gabon	a/	0.03
Malta	0.01	0.01
Fiji	b/	0.01
Mauritius	b/	0.01
Yugoslavia	b/	0.46
Panama	a/	0.02
Trinidad and Tobago	a/	0.05

Source: UNDP.

a/ No contributions paid for 1988, 1989 (as of 1/1/90).

b/ UNDP share significantly lower than United Nations assessed share.

Table 4. UNDP core funding: share by country as a percentage of United Nations assessment scale, 1989

700 % or more	500%-700%	300%-500%	150%-300%	100%-150%
Norway	-	Netherlands	Jordan	Belgium
Denmark		Cameroon	Italy	Austria
Sri Lanka		Switzerland	Bangladesh	India
Sweden			Congo	Chile
Finland			Mongolia	Thailand
			Canada	Zambia
			Pakistan	Cyprus
			Indonesia	Barbados
			Cuba	Mauritius
				Guyana

Source: UNDP.

VI. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

66. From the foregoing analysis, six recommendations emerge for a UNDP funding strategy. They are summarized below.

Recommendation 1

67. Considering the current trends in ODA flows, it is only realistic, within the context of a funding strategy, to give consideration to establishing minimum funding needs, that is, the rate of resource growth required to maintain current programme levels in real terms. According to UNDP estimates (which take into account inflation rates and projected flows of capital and other types of external assistance), programme resources during the fifth programming cycle will have to increase by at least 10 per cent in order to achieve this objective.

Recommendation 2

68. Responding to the demand for UNDP assistance (on the side of recipient countries) and the demand for its services (on the side of the donors and the recipients), the Programme will establish a well-defined technical co-operation and development profile, taking into account the key challenges of the decade ahead and the comparative advantages and strengths of UNDP.

69. Three development challenges, which directly relate to the overall UNDP objective of human development, are emerging as top priorities on the development agenda for the 1990s: (a) strategies for poverty alleviation and investment in people; (b) more efficient economic management; and (c) combining economic growth, human development concerns, and the objectives of natural resource management into an integrated concept of longer-term sustainable development. UNDP intends to equip itself to assist Governments to respond to the challenges that the attainment of these three objectives poses.

Recommendation 3

70. National technical co-operation needs assessments should form the starting point for the UNDP funding strategy. These needs assessments should be prepared preferably as an integral part of the Government's overall external assistance programme, as also stressed in paragraph 17 of General Assembly resolution 44/211.

71. These assessments, together with other relevant information generated during the UNDP programming process (e.g., during mid-term reviews or in connection with the preparation of such special programming events as round-table meetings) will be used to prepare and update estimates of trends in the demand for UNDP assistance.

72. Efforts will be made to adjust the needs assessments to this new purpose by developing methods for projecting the costs, wherever possible, of attaining various identified technical co-operation objectives and developmental goals, especially country-level objectives that correspond to shared global priority concerns.

Recommendation 4

73. While it is important to stress that the availability of non-core resources should not be promoted at the expense of the core resources, it is, for a number of reasons, realistic to assume an increase in non-core funds during the next years. This makes it necessary to establish criteria to guide the link between activities to be financed from core and non-core resources and to provide channels for the utilization of the latter.

74. UNDP proposes to follow the principle of integrated programming based on technical co-operation needs assessments, leading to an expanded country programme, parts of which will be financed from UNDP core funds, while donors could choose either to execute the balance themselves or make non-core funding available, the latter in the form of a United Nations agency trust fund, a UNDP trust fund or as cost-sharing.

Recommendation 5

75. Recognizing the importance the legislative bodies have assigned to central funding and to the additionality that non-core resources can provide, UNDP will, in future, provide the Governing Council with recommendations on the types of needs to be supported respectively from core and non-core resources and on how to manage the links between these two types of resources. The general principle suggested here

for managing this link is to determine the need for, and the use to be made of, non-core resources within the framework of an expanded country programme which goes beyond the activities to be supported from UNDP core resources and covers areas which would benefit from support from non-core resources.

Recommendation 6

76. A major consideration in determining funding needs and levels must be that new development concerns are frequently emerging faster than ones currently supported are being fully met. New concerns should not be taken up to the detriment of old ones which are still relevant, efficient and effective. New global concerns would thus be best introduced through special arrangements such as the SPR, under the clear understanding that the support provided must, within a reasonable period of time, be fully mainstreamed, i.e., integrated into core-funded programmes.

77. This approach, which would introduce added responsiveness and innovation into UNDP programmes, will require a substantial increase in the SPR in the fifth programming cycle. It will also require that the SPR be not committed fully in advance. Its programming should be a continuous evolving process.

Notes

1/ The difference between the inflation rate and the required rate of growth in voluntary contributions arises from the fact that the base of \$1,000 million in 1991 - from which fifth cycle voluntary contributions are calculated in document DP/1990/43 - is not the equivalent of the base from which fifth cycle programme expenditures are projected. Second, the exceptional income from gains on currency exchange and investments in the fourth cycle permitted a level of programme in excess of what would have been possible only with voluntary contributions and the originally anticipated income from investments. It cannot be assumed that similar gains on currency exchange and investment income will be available in the fifth cycle (see para. 4 of document DP/1990/43 for more details).

2/ UNDP must harmonize long-term demands by recipients with the annual short-term uncertainty of voluntary contributions, compounded by fluctuations in exchange rates which can either play havoc with, or boost, UNDP income. The 1981-1985 period illustrates this starkly; UNDP core contributions stagnated as a result of the strength of the dollar, thus obliterating increased national currency contributions by major donors, but in SDRs, its performance showed continuous, albeit modest, growth.

3/ In Africa alone, this has made a significant difference: the share of the administered funds now amounts to 20 per cent of UNDP country-level disbursements in that region. In Latin America, government cost-sharing has reached 40 per cent of UNDP country-level disbursements; in the Arab States, 20 per cent.

Notes (continued)

4/ World Bank loans and credits are not sufficiently concessional to classify as ODA; like other official flows, private flows and export credits, they are thus excluded from these ODA data. As far as the IDA consultants and training are concerned, the Bank's classification of technical co-operation must be taken into account.

5/ "Annual Technical Assistance Report (CY 1988)", World Bank, 1989.

6/ The World Bank executes \$57 million annually for UNDP, and allows the Governments of developing countries to channel an annual \$45 million through the UNDP central funding mechanism as part of the loans and credits they take out with the World Bank.

7/ For details, see sect. III (paras. 24-40, and particularly tables) of the annex, which details donor and recipient trust funds with agencies, compared to their support for UNDP core funding.

8/ For further details on central funding and recent United Nations initiatives, see sect. I.A., annex.

9/ A study by consultants to the Director-General for Development and International Co-operation on Operational Activities for Development entitled Issues relating to the implementation of the concept of central funding of technical co-operation activities (1989).

10/ It might be more appropriate to refer to "opportunity-sharing", because participation in UNDP not only brings opportunities in return flows, but also indirect benefits such as the developing country's national capacity-building, which facilitate the donor's bilateral activities.

Annex

FUNDING DATA

CONTENTS

	<u>Paragraphs</u>	<u>Page</u>
I. FUNDING MODALITIES	1 - 14	30
A. Core funding: burden-sharing and predictability	2 - 9	30
B. Non-core funding	10 - 14	31
II. SAVINGS FOR DEVELOPMENT	15 - 22	32
III. OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE FLOWS	23 - 39	33
A. Net financial flows to developing countries	23 - 25	33
B. The profile of contributions to UNDP	26 - 28	35
C. Geographical distribution of technical co-operation of the United Nations agencies	29 - 36	39
D. United Nations system technical co-operation funding flow data	37 - 39	45
IV. UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM FUNDING DATA	40 - 41	47
Statistical table 1. Donor ODA resources and contributions, including non-core contributions		48
Statistical table 2. Core and co-financing contributions to United Nations agencies, UNDP and UNDP-administered funds, 1979-1988 .		52
Statistical table 3. Agency expenditures by source, 1988		58
Statistical table 4. Summary of agency expenditures by source, ranked by country-level grand total, 1988		63

FUNDING DATA

I. FUNDING MODALITIES

1. The following is a review of options for the consideration of the Governing Council. They share the advantage of relieving some of the annual growth fixation in UNDP core income, and provide an improved measure of predictability and burden-sharing.

A. Core funding: burden-sharing and predictability

1. Replenishment arrangements

2. The main difference between any replenishment arrangement and the present system of voluntary contributions to UNDP lies in the need to pre-establish, on a global basis, the total resources required over a specific period and the respective share of each contributor. Presently, the total of resources is regarded as agreed for planning purposes only; donors decide themselves on their level of contributions.

3. A pre-determination of shares implies some form of burden-sharing, although it is clear from an examination of the various programmes funded by replenishment that burden-sharing is not necessarily linked to the ability to pay.

4. If a replenishment system were to be adopted for UNDP, the soundest basis would be to start with a core level of contributions based on past contributory patterns by each donor; negotiations would then ensue based on a formula for sharing additional contributions. A replenishment system could imply certain changes in the governance and decision-making of UNDP.

5. In negotiations to arrive at total replenishment, both total and country shares thereof are considered. In the World Bank replenishment arrangements, there are various factors at work, such as voting rights, the effect of contributions for concessional lending on the donor country's position, and influence in related institutions. In the final analysis, under a replenishment formula, commitments continue to be essentially of a voluntary nature, but with a greater moral requirement than under the current annual pledging arrangement, whereby Governments seldom give any indication of their contribution to the total five-year programme requirements of UNDP.

2. Assessed contributions

6. Burden-sharing could be fairly allotted if each country's contributory share to UNDP were based, for instance, on the contributory shares stipulated in the United Nations assessed budget. However, were assessed contributions agreed to, UNDP would lose in core volume, unless countries pledging less to UNDP than their assessed United Nations share agreed to increase their contributions to at least that level. Countries which already contribute more than their assessed United

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Nations share may in turn consider such level as the floor for their UNDP core pledges, thus ensuring continuing growth in core resources and maintaining their status as major donors.

3. Multi-year pledges

7. Under a multi-year pledging system, the income predictability of UNDP would benefit if the first year's pledge were equalled in the following years; if it were increased, the growth element could also be anticipated. Without the latter inclusion, multi-year pledges could prove counterproductive to long-term growth commitments, as major contributors could get locked into a process of budgetary caution that might freeze their future commitments at year-one level.

4. Pledges in Special Drawing Rights

8. Pledging in SDRs should lead to greater income predictability and programming. If pledges were obligated in SDRs, donors would need to supplement national currency appropriations if their national currency (or the United States dollar if a contributor chooses to so pledge) weakened against the SDR, but conversely, they would make lower national currency contributions if their currency appreciated. UNDP has found that over time, i.e. since 1972, gains and losses caused by currency fluctuations against the United States dollar have balanced out.

9. Consequently, the major benefit of using SDRs as the unit of obligation once pledges are made is that it improves the short-term predictability of the income position of UNDP. Similar conclusions were reached by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on the use of SDRs as the UNDP unit of currency; they are contained in document DP/1990/43.

B. Non-core funding

10. Cost-sharing, trust funds and Government cash counterpart contributions (GCCC) are the non-core funding modalities of UNDP. As part of the expanded country programme, these modalities could, in future, also be financed from the proceeds of negotiated arrangements between external debt holders and a Government. UNDP could support the developing country in programming for a cash infusion, to finance what could be called a "national development contract". This is a commitment between the debt holder and the Government to carry out activities within the triangle of environment, poverty, and human resources development, involving NGOs as executing agencies. Once signed, this contract becomes a repayment towards the country's external debt, in recognition of its role in helping to protect the world's environmental resources.

11. The inherent value of the national development contract lies in its recognition that: (a) poverty is one of the greatest threats to the global environment; (b) countries have differing environmental priorities; (c) the industrialized countries, having caused a major part of environmental degradation,

have a financial responsibility for the costs of environmental protection; (d) the direct involvement of NGOs in carrying out such national development contracts follows from the recognition that sustainable development strategies must have the co-operation of the affected parties.

12. UNDP can provide assistance in the programming and execution of such initiatives; most importantly, it provides brokering to encourage the dialogue between donors and the Government and between the Government and NGOs. The UNDP-sponsored "Partners in Development" programme, now operational in over 65 countries, has clearly shown the usefulness of such UNDP brokering and its catalytic role.

13. The Governing Council has stressed that national execution should be the ultimate modality for all UNDP-supported projects. The main aim of this modality is to promote self-reliance by the maximum utilization of national capacity and to ensure that programmes and projects are managed in an integrated manner in order to promote their long-term sustainability.

14. The modality has also served to encourage the recipient Government to channel its own resources through UNDP for technical co-operation activities. The Government's direct involvement in executing technical co-operation activities has served as an incentive to tap its own budget. Integrating government cost-sharing funds with IPF resources and using the national execution modality strongly promotes self-reliance and the sustainability of project results. The challenge of the 1990s will be to incorporate expertise of the United Nations agencies into this partnership, through co-operating agency arrangements for implementing certain project components where appropriate.

II. SAVINGS FOR DEVELOPMENT

15. Parallel to the goal for increased resources should be the search to ensure that the highest proportion of net transfers of such resources goes to recipients for specific development purposes. Some thoughts on how this could be achieved are given below.

16. Recipient countries face real costs from the moment they sign loan agreements with multilateral and bilateral financing institutions. Delays in loan executions generate costs without benefits, often reflecting a limited absorption capacity, in particular because of shortcomings in management resources. Recipient authorities could turn to UNDP to seek ways to speed up implementation, thereby reducing the loan cost.

17. Too much attention is focused on the management requirements of individual projects. This has a negative impact on recipient Governments and on the United Nations support capacity. The argument that aid delivery mechanisms are too cumbersome, and therefore too costly, should not focus, however, on the size of the average project, but on its management. What is required, therefore, is more decentralization, at the field office level, to those responsible for project

execution. This would allow the Government and the UNDP field office to concentrate on programme management.

18. The report of the Expert Group on agency support costs will, it is hoped, result in more quality for money, system-wide, and a delivery capacity that allows the highest net transfer of resources to the beneficiaries.

19. Agencies could contract with UNDP, at the country level, for the administrative and logistic requirements of executing technical co-operation projects financed from their own sources. This would enable the agencies to devote more time to substantive support for national priorities and their interlinkages through co-ordination. A similar approach could also be pursued with bilateral programmes.

20. Governments should examine possibilities of execution that would ensure project inputs at lower costs. In this respect, UNV can help countries set up national volunteer services, to support and expand what Governments can make available as development services. OPS could assist in creating national offices for project services. In addition, OPS assistance has been successful in streamlining and increasing transparency in national bidding and procurement procedures, in one case halving the money allotted for procurement and delivery.

21. UNDP has provided leadership in a wide variety of operational modalities for technical co-operation. The use of national expertise - project manager, professionals and equipment - of United Nations volunteers, NGOs, technical co-operation among developing countries (TCDC), the involvement of the Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN), and short-term advisory services (STAS), can all help enhance the value of UNDP assistance since they are cost-effective.

22. In addition, UNDP has introduced a number of programmes and modalities in recent years to strengthen government capacity for the management and co-ordination of technical co-operation. These modalities also enhance the value of development co-operation in general and UNDP assistance in particular. The most important of them are the round-table process and NATCAPs.

III. OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE FLOWS

A. Net financial flows to developing countries

23. Net financial flows in 1988 were 75 per cent of the 1981 volume (see table 1); they would have been even smaller had it not been for growth in ODA.

Annex table 1. Net flows in current billions of dollars

	<u>1981</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>1985</u>	<u>1987</u>	<u>1988</u>
1. Official Development Finance (ODF)	45.6	42.4	49.0	61.7	65.7
of which ODA	36.9	33.9	37.4	48.4	51.3
2. Net export credits	17.6	4.6	4.0	-0.7	3.0
3. Private flows	<u>74.5</u>	<u>48.1</u>	<u>30.8</u>	<u>35.6</u>	<u>32.9</u>
Current billions of dollars	137.7	95.1	83.8	96.6	101.6

Source: OECD.

24. ODA volume has become increasingly dependent on OECD/DAC member countries after exceptional high levels of funding by Arab donors in the mid-1970s and early 1980s.

Annex table 2. ODA volume, by source, in billions of dollars at 1987 exchange rate

	<u>1975-1976</u>	<u>1980-1981</u>	<u>1987-1988</u>
1. OECD/DAC	27.8	35.2	43.1
2. CMEA	3.0	3.8	4.7
3. Arab donors	10.7	12.0	2.7
4. Non-Arab recipient donors	2.5	.8	.4
5. Non-DAC OECD	.1	.3	.3
At 1987 exchange rate	44.1	52.1	51.2

Source: OECD.

25. In real terms, OECD/DAC projects a 2 per cent increase in ODA flows in the coming years. The geographical distribution of such flows can, at best, be indicative only. Table 3 shows this for total net ODA (DAC, Arab and Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) donors, multilateral) and the growing share of sub-Saharan Africa.

Annex table 3. Percentage of net ODA receipts

	<u>1975-1976</u>	<u>1980-1981</u>	<u>1987-1988</u>
Sub-Saharan Africa	19.7	25.8	34.5
Asia	34.2	31.8	33.4
Oceania	3.3	3.2	3.5
North Africa/Middle East	29.2	24.6	14.3
Latin America	12.2	11.3	13.0
South Europe	<u>1.5</u>	<u>3.3</u>	<u>1.4</u>
	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: OECD.

B. The profile of contributions to UNDP

26. Contributions from donors and recipients to UNDP core resources in 1989 amounted to \$950 million; to the UNDP-administered funds, \$71.9 million; and to non-core funding (cost sharing and trust funds), to \$159.2 million. Table 4 identifies countries with \$1 million or over in voluntary contributions to UNDP core and non-core resources, and statistical table 1 of this annex provides further details for the OECD/DAC member countries.

Annex table 4. Major contributors to UNDP, 1989

(Thousands of United States dollars)

A. <u>Core</u>		
	<u>UNDP core</u>	<u>Admin. funds</u>
OECD		
Austria	9 780	54
Australia	12 854	539
Belgium	16 000	1 191
Canada	55 705	917
Denmark	72 410	5 410
Finland	35 566	5 868
France	43 846	582
Germany, Federal Republic of	69 090	535
Italy	78 014	5 162
Japan	83 300	3 350
Netherlands	72 061	6 565
New Zealand	1 447	29
Norway	76 050	6 985
Spain	6 356	47
Sweden	87 937	21 442
Switzerland	33 537	7 835
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	43 024	81
United States of America	111 000	2 400
Others	2 213	49
Subtotal	910 190	69 041
OPEC		
Saudi Arabia	3 500	
Others OPEC	611	
Subtotal	4 111	
CMEA		
USSR	3 024	
Others CMEA	2 728	
Subtotal	5 752	
OTHER CONTRIBUTORS		
India	4 826	90
China	2 580	230

/...

Annex table 4 (continued)

	<u>UNDP core</u>	<u>Admin. funds</u>
Brazil	2 503	8
Cuba	1 404	26
Colombia	1 262	3
Indonesia	1 100	30
Pakistan	1 064	53
Thailand	1 001	5
Others	12 470	2 351
GRAND TOTAL	950 563	71 889

B. Non-core1. OECD contributors

Australia	1 888	Netherlands	12 367
Canada	5 497	New Zealand	1 195
Denmark	10 451	Norway	7 738
Finland	2 130	Portugal	561
France	462	Sweden	6 446
Germany, Federal Republic of	426	Switzerland	3 947
Japan	4 831	United States	2 892
Italy	8 507	Others	176
Total			69 514

2. Recipient contributors

Afghanistan	651	Ethiopia	115
Algeria	1 474	Fiji	263
Argentina	11 430	Guatemala	2 395
Bahrain	407	Honduras	639
Bangladesh	2 079	Indonesia	2 728
Bolivia	2 123	Iran, Islamic Republic of	115
Botswana	1 344	Iraq	521
Brazil	11 455	Jamaica	439
Cameroon	583	Jordan	412
Chile	1 262	Kuwait	1 315
China	7 862	Malaysia	106
Chad	200	Mauritania	194
Colombia	8 942	Mexico	527
Congo	105	Micronesia	113
Costa Rica	233	Morocco	1 400
Djibouti	323	Nepal	325
Dominica	181	Niger	462
Dominican Republic	610	Oman	4 029
Ecuador	859	Papua New Guinea	1 483
Egypt	787	Paraguay	307
El Salvador	422	Peru	488

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Annex table 4 (continued)

Portugal	546	Trust Territory of the	
Philippines	100	Pacific Islands	286
Qatar	803	Tunisia	313
Republic of Korea	203	Turkey	421
Rwanda	425	United Arab Emirates	996
Sao Tome and Principe	185	Uruguay	979
Saudi Arabia	7 467	Venezuela	1 095
Sri Lanka	257	Yemen	513
Swaziland	856	Others	<u>1 061</u>
Syria	250		
Thailand	137	Total	<u>89 655</u>
Trinidad and Tobago	1 054		

C. Contributors to management services contracts, 1989

Australia	1 392	NGOs	3 358
Bolivia	7 591	Niger	6 709
Brazil	488	Pakistan	37
Costa Rica	35	Papua New Guinea	2 010
Côte d'Ivoire	119	Senegal	158
Czechoslovakia	202	Somalia	3 214
Ecuador	356	Sweden	500
Guinea	1 786	Switzerland	307
Honduras	80	Togo	2 448
Italy	3 858	Turkey	605
Madagascar	10 714	Uganda	1 537
Mauritania	2 160	Yemen	397
Netherlands	256		

Source: UNDP.

27. The funding reality of UNDP-administered funds, particularly core funding, is one of modest performance overall, with growth for a few balances and a sharp decline for others.

28. Table 5 compares 1980 with 1990, with UNDP's core performance as comparator. For information, table 5 also provides the 1989 non-core contributions to each fund, highlighting the performance of UNSO, UNFSTD, UNV and UNIFEM.

Annex table 5. UNDP-administered funds, 1980 and 1990 compared

(Millions of United States dollars)

	Core		Non-core 1989	Core		
	1980	1990		% Change 1980:1990	% Share	
					1980	1990
1. UNDP core	716.6	1 045.0		45.8		
2. Administered funds	74.5	72.2	43.3	(3.1)		
UNIFEM	2.4	7.2	5.1	200.0	3.2	10.0
UNV	1.4	2.4	4.4	71.4	1.9	3.3
UNCDF 28.6	40.8	2.6	42.7	38.4	56.5	
UNSO (exc. major cost-sharing)	5.5	6.8	26.8	23.6	7.4	9.4
SMF/LDC	11.7	11.7	-	0.0	15.7	16.2
UNRPNRE	3.0	2.1	-	(30.0)	4.0	2.9
UNFSTD	21.9	1.2	4.4	(94.5)	29.4	1.7
					100.0	100.0

Source: UNDP.

C. Geographical distribution of technical co-operation of the United Nations agencies

29. The United Nations system disbursement profile, made up by volume and sources of funding for each agency, differs markedly from region to region. Table 6, which does not include agency regular budgets, 1/ summarizes the United Nations system's core and non-core disbursements for technical co-operation by region for country, regional and global activities, and by non-core sources from donors and recipients.

30. Non-core contributions by both donors and recipients are detailed in statistical table 2 to this annex, including the percentage represented by non-core agency funding in terms of UNDP core.

Annex table 6. United Nations system technical co-operation disbursements, 1988

(Millions of United States dollars)

	Agencies					UNDP				
	UNFPA et al. a/	Others	Donors	Recip.	Total	IPF	Adm. funds b/	Others	Donors	Total
<u>Country level</u>										
Africa	30.2	7.4	80.5	11.3	129.4	227.8	50.6	5.1	4.1	294.7
Asia	40.6	1.2	32.3	8.6	82.7	201.4	10.4	11.9	2.0	243.6
Latin America and the Caribbean	13.6	0.4	16.4	11.6	42.0	62.8	9.2	4.0	1.0	124.2
Arab States and Europe	13.9	2.6	16.5	48.9	81.9	55.0	6.0	2.8	1.8	81.4
Subtotal	98.3	11.6	145.7	80.4	336.0	547.0	76.2	23.8	8.9	743.9
<u>Regional level</u>										
Africa	15.8	0.7	61.9	-	78.4	48.7	3.2	1.5	5.0	58.4
Asia	5.9	1.5	21.3	-	28.7	38.8	1.5	2.3	-	42.8
Latin America and the Caribbean	5.5	0.5	18.9	-	24.9	11.3	0.9	1.3	1.1	14.6
Arab States and Europe	5.1	0.7	4.3	-	10.1	9.7	-	0.1	0.7	10.5
Subtotal	32.3	3.4	106.4	-	142.1	108.5	5.6	5.2	6.8	126.3
Global level	34.9	9.5	157.8	-	202.2	25.0	10.9	4.1	6.3	46.3
Grand total	165.5	24.5	409.9	80.4	680.3	680.5	92.7	33.1	22.0	916.5
<u>Management services agreements</u>										
		£/	£/	£/	£/	-	-	15.8	51.9	67.7

a/ UNFPA and other multilateral financing institutions.

b/ Includes \$30.0 million donors non-core with these funds.

c/ Agencies' type of MSCs are included in their Trust Funds.

31. The major differences in non-core characteristics, as reflected in table 6 above, can be summarized as follows:


AGENCIES	UNDP
Trust funds, mainly donor-driven; in addition, recipient trust funds equal in volume to UNDP non-core	Donors focus on administered funds and are equal in volume to recipients non-core funding
Mainly for regional and global activities	Mostly country-level activities
Donors focus on Africa, followed by Asia; recipients mainly on Arab States	Mainly Africa, because of administered funds; recipients concentrate on Latin America
<u>Overall</u> , donors' trust funds constitute 60.3 per cent of agencies' technical co-operation disbursements	<u>Overall</u> , excluding administered funds, non-core is 15.6 per cent of the UNDP profile

32. Statistical table 3 of this annex provides detailed information on agency expenditures. Percentages showing the UNDP share of agency financing are shown exclusive of agency regular budget technical co-operation funding, although the amounts are provided for information. What constitutes technical co-operation still requires a more precise definition. It should also be noted that the World Health Organization (WHO) includes overhead percentages in its reporting, as do a number of the smaller agencies.


33. In recent years, a growing share of funding by OECD/DAC members of the United Nations system technical co-operation has gone to the United Nations agencies, largely in support of their regional and global themes. On a global scale, OECD/DAC members' support for UNDP dropped from a high of 80.8 per cent in 1985 to 70.6 per cent in 1988 (see chart 1 below). The OECD/DAC 1987 report entitled Development Co-operation expressed what is at stake as follows, "Within UN funding, the important comparison is between shares in funding of the UNDP and in the provision of extra-budgetary resources directly to UN operational agencies. If a donor's share in the latter is much larger than its share in the former, that donor is in some degree acting to the detriment of the principle of the UNDP's central funding role, even if its share of the funding of UNDP, seen independently, is high" (p. 139).

34. Measured over a longer period, it should be noted that, from a 78 per cent share of United Nations system technical co-operation financing in pre-Consensus years (i.e., before 1970), UNDP dropped to 53 per cent in 1975. Since then, the UNDP share has remained stable, not only in terms of the United Nations system organizations (see chart 2), but also in terms of the United Nations system technical co-operation financing (see chart 3).


Annex Chart 1. OECD/DAC United Nations
technical co-operation funding



Annex Chart 2. United Nations system
share of technical co-operation funding
(Percentage)




Annex Chart 3. UNDP share of United
Nations technical co-operation funding
(Percentage)




35. Trust funds with the United Nations agencies increased from an annual average of \$35 million in the pre-Consensus years to \$200 million immediately thereafter. Since then, they have been a part of the United Nations system funding discussions in general and of those on the central funding role of UNDP in particular; in 1988 they reached \$450 million in 1988. The stability of the United Nations share since the mid-1970s, as illustrated in chart 2, belies, however, the change in the type of funding involved; over time core funding has declined, special purpose funding has increased, in particular with the agencies and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) (see chart 4).

36. Another characteristic that becomes more pronounced is the funding distinction between country and intercountry activities. Donors are increasingly favouring global themes, for which they make trust funds available to the agencies, in recognition of the latter's constitutional responsibility for such themes. This is illustrated in chart 5, in the impressive intercountry growth of the agencies; chart 6 shows the impact of this preference on the UNDP funding profile. At the intercountry (regional and global) level, it shows the sudden erosion in the UNDP share of the United Nations system technical co-operation financing in the early 1970s, but to a lesser degree at the country level, in part reflecting the active pursuit by UNDP of non-core modalities since the late 1970s.


Annex Chart 4. Core and non-core shares of United Nations technical co-operation funding (Percentage)



Annex Chart 5. United Nations technical co-operation expenditures (Millions of US dollars)



Annex Chart 6. UNDP share of United Nations technical co-operation funding (Percentage)



D. United Nations system technical co-operation funding flow data

37. The declining UNDP share resulting from the growth in trust funds with the agencies - in particular WHO and FAO - has been masked by shifts in UNDP favour of recipient non-core funding flows, as illustrated in table 7. The recipient non-core flows represent two contradictory trends: a decline in the Arab region that affects the agencies in particular, and an increase in Latin America, largely in support of the UNDP channel.

38. Table 7 shows that UNDP core contributions from OECD/DAC member countries increased 42.4 per cent, from \$635.9 million in 1979 to \$905.5 million in 1988. Their non-core contributions grew by 173 per cent; this has clearly become a favourite route. Recipient country growth in non-core funding with UNDP was 219 per cent, with the agencies, 30.2 per cent.

39. In summary, major donors increasingly channel their ODA growth through non-core modalities, whereby they favour the agency channels for global/regional activities in support of themes. Recipients increasingly favour UNDP for their non-core contributions, largely at the country level. Even if this conclusion seems transparent, the motives behind it vary; for donors, burden-sharing is an issue, while for recipients it should be noted that, both with the agencies and with UNDP, a large portion of the non-core modality is concentrated in a limited number of countries. It should also be noted that the UNDP overall non-core profile, donor and recipient flows combined, should have data available on the Management Services Agreements (MSA), as similar arrangements are reported by the agencies as part of their non-core (for details, see statistical table 2 of this annex).

Annex table 7: United Nations agencies and UNDP: technical co-operation funding flows, 1979-1988

(Millions of United States dollars)

Year	OECD/DAC countries				Grand total	Agencies as % of total	Other countries non-core				Grand total	Agencies as % of total
	UNDP			Agencies			UNDP					
	Agencies	Core	Non-core				Subtotal	Agencies	Core	Non-core		
1979	152	636	52	688	840	18.1	78	61	47	108	169	41.9
1980	189	657	73	731	920	20.6	84	59	60	119	178	41.4
1981	211	613	66	679	890	23.7	128	60	58	118	178	51.9
1982	206	622	65	687	893	23.1	130	54	65	119	173	52.1
1983	176	624	73	698	874	20.2	106	51	107	158	209	40.0
1984	218	628	78	705	923	23.6	134	52	91	142	104	48.6
1985	174	624	107	713	887	19.2	93	48	92	141	189	39.9
1986	258	728	105	832	1 090	23.7	88	48	102	150	198	37.1
1987	317	822	107	929	1 246	25.5	86	43	102	145	188	37.3
1988	430	905	127	1 033	1 463	29.4	102	43	151	194	237	34.3

Source: UNDP.

Grand total = Agencies + UNDP subtotal.

IV. UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM FUNDING DATA

40. In 1966, OECD/DAC initiated annual aid flow statistics for its member countries. The United Nations system started system-wide data on operational activities for development in 1973; these did not, however, include data for the World Bank and IDA; UNCTAD has been producing statistics on the aid performance of the OPEC member countries for several years.

41. The Governing Council might wish to urge a United Nations system-wide review to:

(a) Harmonize further the criteria for United Nations system data on its operational activities for development, i.e., seek to distinguish between agency regular budget technical co-operation financing in support of the constitutional responsibility of the agency, and technical co-operation that results in free-standing project expenditures;

(b) Seek agreement on definitions that distinguish between technical assistance (as part and in support of capital investment), technical co-operation (in support of the transfer of knowledge), and operational activities; and

(c) Seek agreement on definitions of sources of funding that are tied to procuring inputs from the donor and if and how to report these separately from the untied non-core funding sources.

Notes

1/ Often responding to the constitutional responsibilities of agencies, in particular at regional/global and/or headquarters level. In addition, WHO started in 1976 to classify 60 per cent of its assessed (regular) budget as technical co-operation. In 1988, this alone amounted to \$178.2 million or 70 per cent of the amount allocated by the executing agencies for technical co-operation in their regular budgets. Of total technical co-operation financed from its regular (assessed) budget, WHO disburses 35 per cent for global technical co-operation activities and 21 per cent for regional activities.

Statistical table 1. Donor ODA resources and contributions, including non-core contributions

(Millions of United States dollars)

COUNTRY	YEAR	OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE						UNDP					
		TOTAL	AS % OF GNP	DAC % OF GNP	BILATERAL		MULTILATERAL		VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS \$	% OF ODA	% OF MULTI-LATERAL ODA	GRAND TOTAL \$	% OF ODA
					\$	% OF ODA	\$	% OF ODA					
AUSTRALIA	1976	377	0.41	0.33	318	84.23%	60	15.77%	3.7	0.98%	6.22%		
	1977	400	0.42	0.33	349	87.24%	51	12.76%	4.6	1.15%	9.02%		
	1978	588	0.55	0.35	420	71.39%	168	28.61%	7.8	1.33%	4.64%		
	1979	629	0.53	0.35	467	74.30%	162	25.70%	7.7	1.22%	4.76%	7.8	1.24%
	1980	628	0.48	0.38	448	71.34%	180	28.66%	8.1	1.29%	4.50%	8.1	1.29%
	1981	649	0.41	0.35	547	84.28%	102	15.72%	11.3	1.74%	11.08%	11.5	1.77%
	1982	883	0.56	0.38	565	63.99%	318	36.01%	14.6	1.65%	4.59%	17.4	1.97%
	1983	753	0.49	0.36	534	70.92%	219	29.08%	13.9	1.85%	6.35%	15.7	2.08%
	1984	777	0.46	0.36	608	78.25%	169	21.75%	13.4	1.72%	7.93%	14.1	1.81%
	1985	749	0.49	0.35	535	71.43%	214	28.57%	11.6	1.55%	5.42%	13.1	1.75%
	1986	752	0.47	0.35	513	68.22%	239	31.78%	8.5	1.13%	3.56%	9.3	1.24%
1987	627	0.34	0.34	535	85.33%	92	14.67%	10.7	1.71%	11.63%	11.1	1.77%	
1988	1 101	0.47	0.36	622	56.49%	479	43.51%	13.3	1.21%	2.78%	14.8	1.34%	
AUSTRIA	1976	50	0.12	0.33	30	59.44%	20	40.56%	3.2	6.43%	15.84%		
	1977	108	0.22	0.33	87	79.87%	22	20.13%	3.7	3.42%	16.97%		
	1978	154	0.27	0.35	113	73.15%	41	26.85%	4.2	2.72%	10.14%		
	1979	131	0.19	0.35	62	47.34%	69	52.66%	5.0	3.81%	7.23%	5.0	3.81%
	1980	178	0.23	0.38	151	84.83%	27	15.17%	5.5	3.09%	20.37%	6.6	3.71%
	1981	220	0.33	0.35	161	73.18%	59	26.82%	6.0	2.71%	10.17%	7.0	3.18%
	1982	236	0.35	0.38	165	69.92%	71	30.08%	6.0	2.54%	8.45%	7.0	2.97%
	1983	158	0.23	0.36	127	80.38%	31	19.62%	6.8	4.30%	21.94%	6.9	4.37%
	1984	181	0.24	0.36	137	75.69%	44	24.31%	6.7	3.70%	15.23%	7.4	4.09%
	1985	248	0.38	0.35	174	70.16%	74	29.84%	7.2	2.90%	9.73%	7.4	2.98%
	1986	197	0.21	0.35	141	71.57%	56	28.43%	7.7	3.91%	13.75%	7.8	3.96%
1987	201	0.17	0.34	157	78.11%	44	21.89%	8.3	4.13%	18.86%	8.4	4.18%	
1988	302	0.24	0.36	163	53.97%	139	46.03%	9.7	3.21%	6.98%	9.8	3.25%	
BELGIUM	1976	340	0.51	0.33	229	67.36%	111	32.64%	9.1	2.68%	8.20%		
	1977	371	0.46	0.33	262	70.59%	109	29.41%	12.8	3.45%	11.73%		
	1978	536	0.55	0.35	310	57.90%	226	42.10%	15.4	2.87%	6.82%		
	1979	643	0.57	0.35	445	69.19%	198	30.81%	16.6	2.58%	8.38%	17.2	2.68%
	1980	594	0.50	0.38	455	76.60%	139	23.40%	16.2	2.73%	11.65%	16.6	2.79%
	1981	575	0.59	0.35	369	64.17%	206	35.83%	14.9	2.59%	7.23%	15.4	2.68%
	1982	499	0.59	0.38	293	58.72%	206	41.28%	13.8	2.77%	6.70%	14.2	2.85%
	1983	480	0.59	0.36	289	60.21%	191	39.79%	11.2	2.33%	5.86%	11.8	2.46%
	1984	433	0.56	0.36	260	60.05%	173	39.95%	10.3	2.38%	5.95%	10.7	2.47%
	1985	439	0.54	0.35	273	62.19%	166	37.81%	10.2	2.32%	6.14%	10.8	2.46%
	1986	549	0.49	0.35	362	65.94%	187	34.06%	16.1	2.93%	8.61%	17.1	3.11%
1987	687	0.48	0.34	428	62.30%	259	37.70%	16.4	2.39%	6.33%	17.8	2.59%	
1988	597	0.4	0.36	423	70.85%	174	29.15%	16.1	2.70%	9.25%	18.0	3.02%	
CANADA	1976	887	0.46	0.33	529	59.64%	358	40.36%	28.8	3.25%	8.05%		
	1977	991	0.50	0.33	475	47.95%	516	52.05%	32.4	3.27%	6.28%		
	1978	1 060	0.52	0.35	648	61.16%	412	38.84%	34.6	3.26%	8.40%		
	1979	1 056	0.48	0.35	594	56.22%	462	43.78%	35.1	3.32%	7.59%	35.2	3.33%
	1980	1 075	0.43	0.38	657	61.12%	418	38.88%	35.2	3.27%	8.42%	35.3	3.28%
	1981	1 189	0.42	0.35	746	62.74%	443	37.26%	38.7	3.25%	8.74%	38.1	3.20%
	1982	1 197	0.41	0.38	827	69.09%	370	30.91%	41.8	3.49%	11.30%	42.3	3.53%
	1983	1 429	0.45	0.36	849	59.41%	580	40.59%	49.6	3.47%	8.55%	50.3	3.52%
	1984	1 625	0.50	0.36	1 039	63.94%	586	36.06%	50.0	3.08%	8.53%	51.6	3.18%
	1985	1 631	0.49	0.35	997	61.13%	634	38.87%	43.5	2.67%	6.86%	48.4	2.97%
	1986	1 695	0.48	0.35	1 054	62.18%	641	37.82%	46.4	2.74%	7.24%	50.5	2.98%
1987	1 885	0.47	0.35	1 259	66.79%	626	33.21%	51.6	2.74%	8.24%	55.4	2.94%	
1988	2 342	0.49	0.36	1 579	67.42%	763	32.58%	60.7	2.59%	7.96%	68.8	2.94%	
DENMARK	1976	214	0.56	0.33	117	54.62%	97	45.38%	39.1	18.24%	40.18%		
	1977	258	0.60	0.33	147	57.04%	111	42.96%	45.3	17.56%	40.88%		
	1978	388	0.75	0.35	217	56.06%	170	43.94%	43.1	11.12%	25.31%		
	1979	461	0.77	0.35	260	56.35%	201	43.65%	62.6	13.59%	31.13%	65.5	14.22%
	1980	481	0.74	0.38	266	55.30%	215	44.70%	58.6	12.18%	27.26%	62.0	12.89%
	1981	404	0.73	0.35	203	50.25%	201	49.75%	47.1	11.66%	23.43%	50.7	12.55%
	1982	415	0.76	0.38	215	51.81%	200	48.19%	39.3	9.47%	19.65%	43.6	10.51%
	1983	395	0.73	0.36	237	60.00%	158	40.00%	36.8	9.32%	23.29%	43.2	10.94%
	1984	449	0.85	0.36	223	49.67%	226	50.33%	40.4	9.00%	17.88%	45.2	10.07%
	1985	439	0.80	0.35	228	51.94%	211	48.06%	37.0	8.43%	17.54%	43.6	9.93%
	1986	695	0.89	0.35	362	52.09%	333	47.91%	52.7	7.58%	15.83%	62.4	8.98%
1987	859	0.88	0.35	459	53.43%	400	46.57%	69.5	8.09%	17.38%	86.3	10.05%	
1988	922	0.89	0.36	478	51.84%	444	48.16%	77.1	8.36%	17.36%	87.4	9.48%	

Statistical table 1 (continued)

COUNTRY	YEAR	OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE								UNDP				
		TOTAL	AS % OF GNP	DAC % OF GNP	BILATERAL		MULTILATERAL		VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS \$	% OF ODA	% OF MULTI-LATERAL ODA	GRAND TOTAL \$	% OF ODA	
					\$	% OF ODA	\$	% OF ODA						
FINLAND	1976	51	0.17	0.33	29	56.21%	22	43.79%	5.6	11.05%	25.23%			
	1977	49	0.16	0.33	27	55.12%	22	44.88%	5.4	11.07%	26.66%			
	1978	55	0.16	0.35	23	41.79%	32	58.21%	5.9	10.77%	18.50%			
	1979	90	0.22	0.35	42	47.16%	48	52.84%	6.8	7.56%	14.32%	6.9	7.68%	
	1980	110	0.22	0.38	65	59.09%	45	40.91%	7.8	7.09%	17.33%	8.0	7.27%	
	1981	134	0.28	0.35	78	58.21%	56	41.79%	8.0	5.97%	14.29%	9.6	7.16%	
	1982	144	0.30	0.38	86	59.72%	58	40.28%	7.7	5.35%	13.28%	10.2	7.08%	
	1983	154	0.33	0.36	93	60.39%	61	39.61%	7.9	5.13%	12.95%	9.6	6.23%	
	1984	178	0.36	0.36	108	60.67%	70	39.33%	8.5	4.78%	12.14%	10.7	6.01%	
	1985	211	0.40	0.35	128	60.66%	83	39.34%	8.6	4.08%	10.36%	10.6	5.02%	
FRANCE	1976	1 212	0.35	0.33	912	75.25%	300	24.75%	10.0	0.83%	3.33%			
	1977	1 285	0.34	0.33	935	72.76%	350	27.24%	10.0	0.78%	2.86%			
	1978	1 566	0.33	0.35	1 212	77.35%	355	22.65%	14.0	0.89%	3.95%			
	1979	1 987	0.34	0.35	1 416	71.27%	571	28.73%	16.0	0.81%	2.80%	16.0	0.81%	
	1980	2 154	0.36	0.38	1 453	67.46%	701	32.54%	25.1	1.17%	3.58%	25.1	1.17%	
	1981	2 592	0.45	0.35	1 960	75.62%	632	24.38%	23.7	0.91%	3.75%	23.7	0.91%	
	1982	2 627	0.49	0.38	1 905	72.52%	722	27.48%	26.1	0.99%	3.61%	26.3	1.00%	
	1983	2 500	0.47	0.36	1 830	73.20%	670	26.80%	27.8	1.11%	4.15%	29.3	1.17%	
	1984	2 552	0.52	0.36	1 934	75.78%	618	24.22%	27.5	1.08%	4.45%	29.4	1.15%	
	1985	2 770	0.54	0.35	2 037	73.54%	733	26.46%	25.2	0.91%	3.44%	26.0	0.94%	
GERMANY, FEDERAL REP. OF	1976	1 593	0.36	0.33	1 044	65.56%	549	34.44%	30.5	1.91%	5.56%			
	1977	1 717	0.33	0.33	1 028	59.90%	688	40.10%	39.2	2.28%	5.69%			
	1978	2 348	0.37	0.35	1 561	66.48%	787	33.52%	49.8	2.12%	6.33%			
	1979	3 393	0.45	0.35	2 204	64.95%	1 189	35.05%	58.8	1.73%	4.94%	59.0	1.74%	
	1980	3 566	0.44	0.38	2 323	65.14%	1 243	34.86%	61.9	1.74%	4.98%	62.2	1.74%	
	1981	3 181	0.47	0.35	2 244	70.54%	937	29.46%	47.6	1.50%	5.08%	51.0	1.60%	
	1982	3 151	0.48	0.38	2 265	71.88%	886	28.12%	46.4	1.47%	5.24%	49.1	1.56%	
	1983	3 176	0.49	0.36	2 101	66.15%	1 075	33.85%	44.8	1.41%	4.17%	46.4	1.46%	
	1984	2 782	0.45	0.36	1 868	67.15%	914	32.85%	41.3	1.48%	4.52%	42.6	1.53%	
	1985	2 942	0.47	0.35	1 980	67.30%	962	32.70%	40.4	1.37%	4.20%	40.8	1.39%	
IRELAND	1986	3 831	0.43	0.35	2 642	68.96%	1 189	31.04%	55.4	1.45%	4.66%	56.6	1.48%	
	1987	4 390	0.39	0.35	3 090	70.39%	1 300	29.61%	70.3	1.60%	5.41%	70.9	1.62%	
	1988	4 731	0.39	0.36	3 172	67.05%	1 559	32.95%	77.5	1.64%	4.97%	78.0	1.65%	
ITALY	1976	226	0.13	0.33	78	34.60%	148	65.40%	4.1	1.81%	2.77%			
	1977	198	0.10	0.33	35	17.62%	163	82.38%	4.2	2.12%	2.57%			
	1978	377	0.14	0.35	22	5.92%	354	94.08%	5.3	1.41%	1.50%			
	1979	273	0.08	0.35	23	8.24%	251	91.76%	5.4	1.98%	2.16%	5.4	1.98%	
	1980	684	0.17	0.38	84	12.28%	600	87.72%	13.7	2.00%	2.28%	21.3	3.11%	
	1981	665	0.19	0.35	172	25.86%	493	74.14%	16.9	2.54%	3.43%	19.8	2.98%	
	1982	811	0.24	0.38	309	38.10%	502	61.90%	23.2	2.86%	4.62%	26.1	3.22%	
	1983	827	0.24	0.36	443	53.57%	384	46.43%	25.8	3.12%	6.72%	37.5	4.53%	
	1984	1 133	0.33	0.36	625	55.16%	508	44.84%	26.3	2.32%	5.18%	43.3	3.82%	
	1985	1 098	0.31	0.35	781	71.13%	317	28.87%	31.5	2.87%	9.94%	72.1	6.57%	
JAPAN	1986	2 404	0.40	0.35	1 487	61.86%	917	38.14%	42.5	1.77%	4.63%	57.1	2.38%	
	1987	2 615	0.35	0.34	1 878	71.82%	737	28.18%	55.2	2.11%	7.49%	63.0	2.41%	
	1988	3 183	0.39	0.36	2 408	75.65%	775	24.35%	56.4	1.77%	7.28%	70.9	2.23%	
	1976	1 105	0.20	0.33	753	68.14%	352	31.86%	20.0	1.81%	5.68%			
	1977	1 425	0.21	0.33	899	63.13%	525	36.87%	22.0	1.54%	4.19%			
	1978	2 215	0.23	0.35	1 531	69.11%	684	30.89%	25.0	1.13%	3.65%			
	1979	2 685	0.27	0.35	1 969	73.32%	716	26.68%	35.0	1.30%	4.89%	38.0	1.42%	
	1980	3 353	0.32	0.38	2 010	59.95%	1 343	40.05%	41.0	1.22%	3.05%	42.0	1.25%	
	1981	3 170	0.28	0.35	2 260	71.29%	910	28.71%	45.9	1.45%	5.04%	48.9	1.54%	
	1982	3 023	0.28	0.38	2 367	78.30%	656	21.70%	51.4	1.70%	7.84%	54.4	1.80%	
	1983	2 761	0.33	0.36	2 425	87.83%	336	12.17%	54.8	1.98%	16.31%	58.2	2.11%	
	1984	4 318	0.35	0.36	2 427	56.21%	1 891	43.79%	58.8	1.36%	3.11%	62.2	1.44%	
	1985	3 797	0.29	0.35	2 557	67.34%	1 240	32.66%	62.5	1.65%	5.04%	66.4	1.75%	

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Statistical table 1 (continued)

COUNTRY	YEAR	OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE						U N D P					
		TOTAL	AS % OF GNP	DAC % OF GNP	BILATERAL		MULTILATERAL		VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS \$	% OF ODA	% OF MULTI-LATERAL ODA	GRAND TOTAL \$	% OF ODA
					\$	% OF ODA	\$	% OF ODA					
NETHERLANDS	1976	728	0.23	0.33	496	68.12%	232	31.88%	52.3	7.18%	22.52%		
	1977	908	0.25	0.33	644	70.91%	264	29.09%	56.7	6.25%	21.48%		
	1978	1 074	0.28	0.35	789	73.52%	284	26.48%	61.8	5.76%	21.74%		
	1979	1 473	0.98	0.35	1 031	70.01%	442	29.99%	73.5	4.99%	16.64%	92.3	6.27%
	1980	1 631	1.03	0.38	1 228	75.29%	403	24.71%	78.5	4.81%	19.48%	101.0	6.19%
	1981	1 510	1.08	0.35	1 143	75.70%	367	24.30%	63.9	4.23%	17.41%	78.8	5.22%
	1982	1 472	1.08	0.38	1 064	72.28%	408	27.72%	61.5	4.18%	15.07%	73.1	4.97%
	1983	1 195	0.91	0.36	812	67.95%	383	32.05%	57.3	4.79%	14.96%	68.1	5.70%
	1984	1 268	1.02	0.36	879	69.32%	389	30.68%	46.5	3.67%	11.95%	56.2	4.43%
	1985	1 134	0.91	0.35	762	67.20%	372	32.80%	43.5	3.84%	11.69%	53.8	4.74%
	1986	1 740	1.01	0.35	1 180	67.82%	560	32.18%	62.4	3.59%	11.14%	74.4	4.28%
1987	2 095	0.98	0.34	1 419	67.73%	676	32.27%	75.9	3.62%	11.23%	91.3	4.36%	
1988	2 231	0.98	0.36	1 552	69.57%	679	30.43%	81.8	3.67%	12.05%	97.0	4.35%	
NEW ZEALAND	1976	53	0.41	0.33	44	81.77%	10	18.23%	2.1	3.95%	21.65%		
	1977	53	0.39	0.33	42	79.43%	11	20.57%	1.5	2.86%	13.89%		
	1978	55	0.34	0.35	45	81.79%	10	18.21%	1.2	2.19%	12.00%		
	1979	68	0.33	0.35	53	77.86%	15	22.14%	1.6	2.35%	10.60%	1.6	2.35%
	1980	72	0.33	0.38	52	72.22%	20	27.78%	1.3	1.81%	6.50%	1.3	1.81%
	1981	68	0.29	0.35	51	75.00%	17	25.00%	1.2	1.76%	7.06%	1.2	1.76%
	1982	65	0.28	2.38	49	75.38%	16	24.62%	1.2	1.85%	7.50%	1.2	1.85%
	1983	62	0.28	0.36	48	77.42%	14	22.58%	1.1	1.77%	7.86%	1.1	1.77%
	1984	55	0.25	0.36	44	80.00%	11	20.00%	1.0	1.82%	9.09%	1.0	1.82%
	1985	54	0.25	0.35	43	79.63%	11	20.37%	1.3	2.41%	11.82%	1.3	2.41%
	1986	75	0.30	0.35	61	81.33%	14	18.67%	1.6	2.13%	11.43%	2.0	2.67%
1987	86	0.26	0.34	66	76.74%	20	23.26%	1.7	1.98%	8.50%	2.1	2.44%	
1988	105	0.27	0.36	93	88.57%	12	11.43%	1.6	1.52%	13.33%	2.4	2.29%	
NORWAY	1976	218	0.70	0.33	106	48.58%	112	51.42%	21.3	9.77%	19.00%		
	1977	295	0.83	0.33	165	55.92%	130	44.08%	28.3	9.58%	21.74%		
	1978	355	0.90	0.35	192	54.15%	163	45.85%	34.2	9.64%	21.03%		
	1979	429	0.93	0.35	249	57.92%	181	42.08%	41.1	9.57%	22.74%	46.1	10.74%
	1980	486	0.85	0.38	284	58.44%	202	41.56%	48.0	9.88%	23.76%	54.3	11.17%
	1981	467	0.82	0.35	265	56.75%	202	43.25%	48.8	10.45%	24.16%	61.8	13.23%
	1982	559	0.99	0.38	326	58.32%	233	41.68%	55.1	9.86%	23.65%	65.5	11.72%
	1983	584	1.06	0.36	331	56.68%	253	43.32%	50.9	8.72%	20.12%	60.5	10.36%
	1984	543	1.02	0.36	307	56.54%	236	43.46%	45.6	8.40%	19.32%	57.6	10.61%
	1985	575	1.03	0.35	329	57.22%	246	42.78%	46.2	8.03%	18.78%	55.6	9.67%
	1986	798	1.20	0.35	479	60.03%	319	39.97%	56.9	7.13%	17.84%	72.9	9.14%
1987	891	1.09	0.34	528	59.26%	363	40.74%	65.7	7.37%	18.10%	80.9	9.08%	
1988	985	1.1	0.36	572	58.07%	413	41.93%	76.3	7.75%	18.47%	89.1	9.05%	
SWEDEN	1976	608	0.82	0.33	401	66.05%	206	33.95%	50.7	8.34%	24.58%		
	1977	779	0.99	0.33	486	62.36%	293	37.64%	57.6	7.39%	19.64%		
	1978	783	0.90	0.35	473	60.44%	310	39.56%	61.1	7.81%	19.74%		
	1979	988	0.97	0.35	651	65.89%	337	34.11%	70.3	7.12%	20.87%	83.7	8.48%
	1980	962	0.79	0.38	715	74.32%	247	25.68%	76.6	7.96%	31.01%	97.6	10.15%
	1981	919	0.83	0.35	603	65.61%	316	34.39%	62.6	6.81%	19.81%	75.6	8.23%
	1982	987	1.02	0.38	586	59.37%	401	40.63%	53.1	5.38%	13.24%	67.6	6.85%
	1983	754	0.85	0.36	526	69.76%	228	30.24%	49.2	6.53%	21.58%	61.0	8.09%
	1984	741	0.80	0.36	526	70.99%	215	29.01%	45.0	6.07%	20.93%	59.1	7.98%
	1985	840	0.86	0.35	580	69.05%	260	30.95%	48.4	5.76%	18.62%	62.3	7.42%
	1986	1 090	0.85	0.35	777	71.28%	313	28.72%	63.1	5.79%	20.16%	81.0	7.43%
1987	1 375	0.88	0.34	896	65.16%	479	34.84%	76.4	5.56%	15.95%	96.2	7.00%	
1988	1 529	0.87	0.36	1 054	68.93%	475	31.07%	82.7	5.41%	17.41%	107.9	7.06%	
SWITZERLAND	1976	112	0.19	0.33	67	59.61%	45	40.39%	7.9	7.03%	17.40%		
	1977	119	0.19	0.33	69	58.15%	50	41.85%	9.1	7.65%	18.27%		
	1978	173	0.20	0.35	101	58.17%	73	41.83%	10.4	6.00%	14.34%		
	1979	213	0.21	0.35	115	54.11%	98	45.89%	14.2	6.68%	14.55%	18.5	8.70%
	1980	253	0.24	0.38	177	69.96%	76	30.04%	16.6	6.56%	21.84%	23.6	9.33%
	1981	237	0.24	0.35	163	68.78%	74	31.22%	15.3	6.46%	20.68%	20.2	8.52%
	1982	252	0.25	0.38	184	73.02%	68	26.98%	17.7	7.02%	26.03%	23.0	9.13%
	1983	320	0.32	2.36	218	68.13%	102	31.88%	17.2	5.38%	16.86%	24.6	7.69%
	1984	285	0.30	0.36	218	76.49%	67	23.51%	17.0	5.96%	25.37%	22.0	7.72%
	1985	303	0.31	0.35	228	75.25%	75	24.75%	17.7	5.84%	23.60%	24.1	7.95%
	1986	421	0.30	0.35	323	76.72%	98	23.28%	26.4	6.27%	26.94%	35.0	8.31%
1987	547	0.31	0.34	389	71.12%	158	28.88%	31.7	5.80%	20.06%	41.8	7.64%	
1988	617	0.32	0.36	445	72.12%	172	27.88%	35.4	5.74%	20.58%	45.2	7.33%	

Statistical table 1 (continued)

COUNTRY	YEAR	OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE								U N D P				
		TOTAL	AS % OF GNP	DAC % OF GNP	BILATERAL		MULTILATERAL		VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS \$	% OF ODA	% OF MULTI-LATERAL ODA	GRAND TOTAL a/	% OF ODA	
					\$	% OF ODA	\$	% OF ODA						
UNITED KINGDOM	1976	880	0.37	0.33	581	66.03%	299	33.97%	29.2	3.32%	9.774			
	1977	1 103	0.45	0.33	552	50.03%	551	49.97%	34.4	3.12%	6.24%			
	1978	1 465	0.46	0.35	854	58.28%	611	41.72%	47.6	3.25%	7.75%			
	1979	2 157	0.52	0.35	1 215	56.32%	942	43.68%	58.1	2.69%	6.17%	58.5	2.71%	
	1980	1 854	0.35	0.38	1 328	71.63%	526	28.37%	34.9	1.88%	6.63%	34.9	1.88%	
	1981	2 192	0.43	0.35	1 327	60.54%	865	39.46%	34.2	1.56%	3.95%	34.2	1.56%	
	1982	1 800	0.37	0.38	958	53.22%	842	46.78%	32.6	1.81%	3.87%	32.7	1.82%	
	1983	1 605	0.35	0.36	859	53.52%	746	46.48%	28.5	1.78%	3.82%	29.3	1.83%	
	1984	1 418	0.33	0.36	772	54.44%	646	45.56%	26.8	1.89%	4.15%	26.8	1.89%	
	1985	1 531	0.34	0.35	860	56.17%	671	43.83%	24.4	1.59%	3.64%	24.4	1.59%	
	1986	1 749	0.32	0.35	1 022	58.43%	727	41.57%	31.1	1.78%	4.28%	31.6	1.81%	
1987	1 871	0.28	0.34	1 008	53.87%	863	46.13%	36.3	1.94%	4.21%	36.4	1.95%		
1988	2 645	0.32	0.36	1 430	54.06%	1 215	45.94%	43.4	1.64%	3.57%	44.7	1.69%		
UNITED STATES	1976	4 360	0.26	0.33	2 838	65.09%	1 522	34.91%	100.0	2.29%	6.57%			
	1977	4 682	0.25	0.33	2 897	61.87%	1 785	38.13%	100.0	2.14%	5.60%			
	1978	5 664	0.27	0.35	3 474	61.34%	2 190	38.66%	115.0	2.03%	5.25%			
	1979	4 684	0.20	0.35	4 076	87.02%	608	12.98%	126.0	2.69%	20.72%	128.7	2.75%	
	1980	7 138	0.27	0.38	4 366	61.17%	2 772	38.83%	126.1	1.77%	4.55%	128.5	1.80%	
	1981	5 782	0.20	0.35	4 317	74.66%	1 465	25.34%	125.8	2.18%	8.59%	129.2	2.23%	
	1982	8 202	0.27	0.38	4 861	59.27%	3 341	40.73%	127.5	1.55%	3.82%	130.6	1.59%	
	1983	7 992	0.24	0.36	5 493	68.73%	2 499	31.27%	139.3	1.74%	5.57%	142.6	1.78%	
	1984	8 711	0.24	0.36	6 457	74.12%	2 254	25.88%	158.7	1.82%	7.04%	161.6	1.86%	
	1985	9 403	0.24	0.35	8 182	87.01%	1 221	12.99%	161.4	1.72%	13.22%	166.7	1.77%	
	1986	9 564	0.23	0.35	7 602	79.49%	1 962	20.51%	136.5	1.43%	6.96%	141.9	1.48%	
1987	8 945	0.20	0.34	7 007	78.33%	1 938	21.67%	107.5	1.20%	5.55%	110.4	1.23%		
1988	10 141	0.21	0.36	6 765	66.71%	3 376	33.29%	110.0	1.08%	3.26%	115.0	1.13%		
TOTAL DAC	1976	13 014		0.33	8 571	65.86%	4 443	34.14%	417.6	3.21%	9.40%			
	1977	14 740		0.33	9 098	61.72%	5 642	38.28%	467.2	3.17%	8.28%			
	1978	18 854		0.35	11 985	63.57%	6 869	36.43%	536.4	2.85%	7.81%			
	1979	21 358		0.35	14 870	69.62%	6 488	30.38%	633.8	2.97%	9.77%	685.4	3.21%	
	1980	25 219		0.38	16 062	63.69%	9 157	36.31%	655.1	2.60%	7.15%	728.4	2.89%	
	1981	23 954		0.35	16 609	69.34%	7 345	30.66%	611.9	2.55%	8.33%	676.7	2.82%	
	1982	26 323		0.38	17 025	64.68%	9 298	35.32%	619.0	2.35%	6.66%	684.3	2.60%	
	1983	25 145		0.36	17 215	68.46%	7 930	31.54%	622.9	2.48%	7.85%	696.1	2.77%	
	1984	27 449		0.36	18 432	67.15%	9 017	32.85%	623.8	2.27%	6.92%	701.5	2.56%	
	1985	28 203		0.35	20 691	73.36%	7 512	26.64%	621.7	2.20%	8.28%	728.5	2.58%	
	1986	35 077		0.35	24 629	70.21%	10 448	29.79%	722.5	2.06%	6.92%	828.4	2.36%	
1987	39 389		0.34	27 834	70.66%	11 555	29.34%	817.1	2.07%	7.07%	924.4	2.35%		
1988	46 010		0.36	31 095	67.58%	14 915	32.42%	899.8	1.96%	6.03%	1 026.8	2.23%		

Source: Voluntary contributions: DOF (Treasury) Printouts through January 1989.

ODA: OECD Development Co-operation Reviews through 1989.

a/ Includes UNDP core, funds core and co-financing.

Statistical table 2. Core and co-financing contributions to United Nations agencies, UNDP and UNDP-administered funds, 1979-1988

(Millions of United States dollars)

OECD/DAC MEMBER COUNTRIES (Ranked by 1988 agencies as % of UNDP)	YEAR	UN SPECIALIZED AGENCIES							UNDP			SUB- TOTAL	AGENCY AS % OF UNDP SUB- TOTAL	a/ NSA
		FAO	WHO	UN	UNESCO	ILO	UNIDO	OTHER	CORE	ADMIN FUNDS	NON- CORE			
Italy	1979	0.1		0.1	0.1		0.1	0.1	5.4	0.0	0.0	5.4	9.3%	
	1980	13.2		0.3			1.0	0.2	13.7	7.4	0.2	21.3	69.0%	
	1981	20.0		0.3	0.1		3.1	1.1	16.9	1.9	1.0	19.8	124.2%	
	1982	8.2	1.3	0.3	1.0	1.0	1.6	0.6	23.2	2.3	0.6	26.1	53.6%	
	1983	19.5	1.3	0.9	0.1	0.1	3.5	1.8	25.8	2.4	9.3	37.5	72.5%	
	1984	23.5	3.9	2.5	0.1	5.9	1.2	3.2	26.3	2.3	14.7	43.3	93.1%	
	1985	5.7	3.8	-0.2	0.8	2.0	3.0	3.8	31.5	3.2	37.4	72.1	26.2%	63.8
	1986	27.1	5.7	1.1	0.8	1.4	6.7	2.2	42.5	3.9	10.7	57.1	78.8%	57.5
	1987	3.4	6.7	0.1	0.1	8.6	23.3	2.8	55.2	4.6	3.2	63.0	71.4%	31.2
	1988	56.3	8.3	1.6	0.8	2.1	15.8	4.8	56.4	5.5	9.0	70.9	126.5%	15.6
Belgium	1979	5.6	0.6	0.9	0.1	1.5	0.5	0.7	16.6	0.3	0.3	17.2	57.6%	
	1980	10.3	1.5	1.5	0.7	2.4	1.0	1.2	16.2	0.2	0.2	16.6	112.0%	
	1981	6.7	1.1	0.8	0.3	2.1	0.9	1.8	15.0	0.4	0.0	15.4	89.0%	
	1982	9.2	0.7	1.8	0.8	1.9	1.2	1.3	13.8	0.4	0.0	14.2	119.0%	
	1983	4.9	0.8	2.3	1.3	1.5	1.5	1.2	11.2	0.3	0.3	11.8	114.4%	
	1984	6.7	0.4	2.5	0.2	1.5	0.7	0.8	10.3	0.3	0.1	10.7	119.6%	
	1985	2.2	0.5	0.9	0.3	1.5	(0.1)	1.9	10.2	0.5	0.1	10.8	66.7%	
	1986	3.6	0.1	2.4	0.5	1.7	0.2	1.2	16.1	0.8	0.2	17.1	56.7%	
	1987	12.6	0.3	0.8	0.4	2.0	1.0	1.4	16.4	1.4	0.0	17.8	103.9%	
	1988	6.2	0.9	2.6	1.0	1.7	0.9	1.2	16.1	1.2	0.7	18.0	80.6%	
Netherlands	1979	9.8	2.5	1.9	1.8	4.8	0.3	3.2	73.4	16.9	2.0	92.3	26.3%	
	1980	10.8	3.0	1.9	0.8	5.9	0.3	7.9	78.5	18.9	3.6	101.0	30.3%	
	1981	14.5	4.5	2.0	0.2	8.0	0.2	6.3	63.9	7.9	7.0	78.8	45.3%	
	1982	15.1	3.2	2.3	2.0	6.9	0.4	5.5	61.5	5.6	6.0	73.1	48.4%	
	1983	6.1	2.9	2.1	0.4	7.1	0.1	4.6	57.3	5.3	5.5	68.1	34.2%	
	1984	11.0	2.7	2.5	0.4	5.7	0.7	5.5	46.5	3.8	5.9	56.2	50.7%	
	1985	12.8	2.1	2.1	0.1	3.9	0.8	4.2	43.5	3.7	6.6	53.8	48.3%	
	1986	10.2	6.9	1.6	3.5	0.5	6.1	28.8	62.4	5.7	6.3	74.4	38.7%	
	1987	21.6	7.6	1.5	7.3	2.2	6.1	46.3	75.9	6.8	8.6	91.3	50.7%	
	1988	25.5	10.1	2.5	6.2	1.4	6.8	52.5	81.8	7.1	8.1	97.0	54.1%	1.2
UNITED KINGDOM	1979	7.8	3.6		0.1			0.3	58.1	0.0	0.4	58.5	20.2%	
	1980	2.1	3.6				0.8	0.7	34.9	0.0	0.0	34.9	20.6%	
	1981	0.3	2.4				0.3	0.4	34.2	0.0	0.0	34.2	9.9%	
	1982	0.3	2.0				0.4	0.3	32.6	0.0	0.1	32.7	9.2%	
	1983		2.2				0.4	0.4	28.5	0.0	0.8	29.3	10.2%	
	1984		2.4		0.1		0.5	0.4	26.8	0.0	0.0	26.8	12.7%	
	1985				0.1		0.3	3.0	24.4	0.0	0.0	24.4	13.9%	
	1986	0.1	4.5		0.1		0.5	0.5	31.1	0.1	0.4	31.6	18.0%	
	1987	0.2	5.9		0.4		0.6	0.6	36.3	0.1	0.0	36.4	21.2%	
	1988	0.1	19.3		0.1		1.2	0.7	43.4	0.1	1.2	44.7	47.9%	
Switzerland	1979	5.7	0.5	0.1	0.1	1.0		0.4	14.2	3.7	0.6	18.5	42.2%	
	1980	5.2	0.5	0.3	0.1	1.9	1.5	0.5	16.6	6.5	0.5	23.6	42.4%	
	1981	3.7	0.5	0.2	0.3	4.0	0.2	0.6	15.3	4.6	0.3	20.2	47.0%	
	1982	2.3	0.8	0.2	0.4	1.0	0.6	1.2	17.7	5.2	0.1	23.0	28.3%	
	1983	4.2	0.8	0.4	0.3	1.2	0.2	1.1	17.2	7.0	0.4	24.6	33.3%	
	1984	5.7	0.6	0.3		1.2	0.1	1.2	17.0	4.1	0.9	22.0	41.4%	
	1985	3.9	0.7	0.1		1.8	0.4	0.2	17.7	4.4	2.0	24.1	29.5%	
	1986	3.4	1.1	0.1	0.7	1.7	0.4	1.9	26.4	6.8	1.8	35.0	26.6%	
	1987	4.4	1.7	0.1	0.4	3.5	0.7	3.3	31.7	7.8	2.3	41.8	33.7%	
	1988	3.3	7.1	0.2	0.5	2.4	1.3	5.6	35.4	8.4	1.4	45.2	45.1%	
Sweden	1979	10.2	12.4	0.4	0.7	4.4	1.3	8.9	70.1	12.9	0.5	83.7	45.8%	
	1980	11.0	11.3	0.3	1.6	8.3	1.6	2.3	76.6	19.6	1.4	97.6	37.3%	
	1981	12.4	11.0	0.5	0.4	4.0	0.8	9.8	62.6	12.2	0.8	75.6	51.5%	
	1982	12.8	8.1	1.2	2.8	5.8	0.5	6.9	53.1	13.3	1.2	67.6	56.4%	
	1983	5.2	10.9	0.4	0.8	3.9	0.3	5.5	49.2	10.6	1.2	61.0	44.3%	
	1984	5.7	6.0	0.4	1.0	3.6	0.1	5.3	45.0	12.2	1.9	59.1	37.4%	
	1985	7.4	9.3	1.0	0.9	2.6	0.2	3.2	48.4	12.4	1.5	62.3	39.5%	
	1986	4.7	11.2	1.8	1.5	1.3	0.2	5.1	63.1	15.8	2.1	81.0	31.9%	
	1987	6.7	13.1	0.1	1.0	2.4	0.2	8.5	76.4	17.6	2.2	96.2	33.3%	
	1988	1.1	30.4	0.1	1.4	2.8		11.5	82.7	19.6	5.6	107.9	43.8%	

Statistical table 2 (continued)

OECD/DAC MEMBER COUNTRIES (Ranked by 1988 agencies as % of UNDP)	YEAR	UN SPECIALIZED AGENCIES							SUB- TOTAL	UNDP			SUB- TOTAL	AGENCY AS % OF UNDP SUB- TOTAL	a/ MSA
		FAO	WHO	UN	UNESCO	ILO	UNIDO	OTHER		CORE	ADMIN FUNDS	NON- CORE			
Japan	1979	0.5	0.1	1.3	0.8	0.3	0.3	0.1	3.4	35.0	3.0	0.0	38.0	8.9%	-----
	1980	0.9	0.1	2.3	0.3	0.5	0.7	3.0	7.8	41.0	1.0	0.0	42.0	18.6%	
	1981	0.9	0.5	1.9	1.0	0.7	0.6	3.0	8.6	45.9	3.0	0.0	48.9	17.6%	
	1982	1.5	1.5	1.9	1.0	0.9	1.9	2.2	10.9	51.4	3.0	0.0	54.4	20.0%	
	1983	1.8	1.7	3.6	0.9	0.8	0.3	2.3	11.4	54.8	3.0	0.4	58.2	19.6%	
	1984	1.6	1.7	4.1	0.9	0.6	1.9	2.9	13.7	58.8	3.0	0.4	62.2	22.0%	
	1985	3.3	0.9	3.1	1.1	0.8	1.3	3.5	14.0	62.5	3.2	0.7	66.4	21.1%	
	1986	5.4	2.7	7.0	0.9	0.8	0.9	3.6	21.3	64.8	3.3	1.5	69.6	30.6%	
	1987	5.1	2.8	6.0	0.6	0.8	2.4	5.2	22.9	70.1	3.0	2.7	75.8	30.2%	
	1988	6.2	8.1	11.4	1.7	0.6	2.2	4.7	34.9	79.0	3.4	5.0	87.4	39.9%	
Germany, Federal Republic of	1979	1.8	2.0	0.5	0.6	1.6	2.3	0.9	9.7	58.8	0.2	0.0	59.0	16.4%	-----
	1980	1.9	3.7	0.4	1.7	1.5	2.4	3.6	15.2	61.9	0.2	0.1	62.2	24.4%	
	1981	1.4	3.0	0.2	2.1	2.9	2.4	4.1	16.1	47.6	1.3	2.1	51.0	31.6%	
	1982	1.4	1.3	0.4	3.6	2.4	3.0	3.9	16.0	46.4	0.0	2.7	49.1	32.6%	
	1983	1.2	1.1	0.9	2.7	1.7	2.8	2.9	13.3	44.8	0.1	1.5	46.4	28.7%	
	1984	0.9	1.1	0.9	1.9	2.0	3.3	3.6	13.7	41.3	0.0	1.3	42.6	32.2%	
	1985	0.6	1.1	0.3	2.0	2.1	2.4	2.9	11.4	40.4	0.1	0.3	40.8	27.9%	
	1986	1.0	1.5	0.5	2.3	3.0	4.2	3.3	15.8	55.4	0.3	0.9	56.6	27.9%	
	1987	1.2	2.4	0.8	3.7	3.9	4.6	4.6	21.4	70.3	0.3	0.3	70.9	30.2%	
	1988	1.2	5.1	1.5	5.0	3.8	5.7	6.4	28.7	77.5	0.2	0.3	78.0	36.8%	
Norway	1979	5.2	3.8		1.8	2.4		3.2	16.4	41.1	5.0	0.0	46.1	35.6%	-----
	1980	5.0		0.1	0.1	2.3	0.1	3.7	11.3	48.0	6.3	0.0	54.3	20.8%	
	1981	3.9	3.8	0.1	1.6	2.4		3.8	15.6	48.8	13.0	0.0	61.8	25.2%	
	1982	3.9	2.2	0.8	2.2	2.5		4.2	15.8	55.1	10.4	0.0	65.5	24.1%	
	1983	4.4	2.4	0.2	2.3	3.4		3.9	16.6	50.9	7.1	2.5	60.5	27.4%	
	1984	4.6	2.8	0.4	2.1	2.4		4.0	16.3	45.6	6.3	5.7	57.6	28.3%	
	1985	4.7	2.8	0.1	1.6	3.7		4.8	17.7	46.1	4.4	5.1	55.6	31.8%	
	1986	5.0	3.8	0.4	2.3	4.9		6.2	22.6	56.9	7.4	8.6	72.9	31.0%	
	1987	5.6	6.1		2.9	9.3	0.3	6.3	30.5	65.7	6.3	8.9	80.9	37.7%	
	1988	4.7	13.2	0.2	2.9	5.7	0.5	5.3	32.5	76.3	6.9	5.9	89.1	36.5%	
Denmark	1979	6.5	2.4	0.6	0.3	2.6	0.3	0.7	13.4	62.6	2.9	0.0	65.5	20.5%	-----
	1980	7.2	2.0	0.1	0.5	3.3	0.1	0.6	13.8	58.6	3.4	0.0	62.0	27.3%	
	1981	11.2	2.1		0.2	4.1	0.1	0.8	18.5	47.1	2.8	0.8	50.7	36.5%	
	1982	9.7	3.1	0.4	0.2	6.9	0.1	0.8	21.2	39.3	3.7	0.6	43.6	48.6%	
	1983	4.2	3.5	0.8	0.7	2.4	0.1	0.8	12.5	36.8	2.4	4.0	43.2	28.9%	
	1984	14.4	4.4	0.8	0.2	5.6	0.3	1.6	27.3	40.4	2.3	2.5	45.2	60.4%	
	1985	2.7	3.8	0.2	0.2	7.3	0.1	0.9	15.2	37.0	2.4	4.2	43.6	34.9%	
	1986	19.9	5.4	0.8	0.1	6.6	0.1	1.4	34.3	52.7	3.7	6.0	62.4	55.0%	
	1987	11.8	7.1	0.1	0.6	8.7	0.1	1.3	29.7	69.5	4.8	12.0	86.3	34.4%	
	1988	9.1	11.1	0.8	0.2	4.9	0.6	1.7	28.4	77.1	5.3	5.0	87.4	32.5%	
Finland	1979	0.3	0.4	0.1		0.6	0.3	0.4	2.1	6.8	0.1	0.0	6.9	30.4%	-----
	1980	0.9	0.4	0.1	0.1	1.1		0.2	2.8	7.8	0.2	0.0	8.0	35.0%	
	1981	0.8	0.5	0.1	0.2	0.9	0.3	0.8	3.6	8.0	1.4	0.2	9.6	37.5%	
	1982	1.4	0.6	0.2	0.2	1.1	0.4	0.6	4.5	7.7	2.1	0.4	10.2	44.1%	
	1983	1.7	0.7	0.3	0.2	1.2	0.1	0.7	4.9	7.9	1.6	0.1	9.6	51.0%	
	1984	1.0	1.0	0.2	0.5	1.6	0.6	1.5	6.4	8.5	1.7	0.5	10.7	59.8%	
	1985	1.9	1.1	0.1	0.3	1.5	0.1	1.5	6.5	8.5	1.8	0.3	10.6	61.3%	
	1986	1.7	1.4	0.2	0.2	1.4	0.3	1.4	6.6	16.1	2.6	4.2	22.9	28.8%	
	1987	2.2	1.8		0.7	1.4	1.3	2.3	9.7	26.3	4.1	1.4	31.8	30.5%	
	1988	2.6	4.0	0.2	0.5	2.0	0.1	3.9	13.3	34.0	6.0	3.8	43.8	30.4%	
Austria	1979	0.2	0.3				0.4	0.1	1.0	5.0	0.0	0.0	5.0	20.0%	-----
	1980	0.4	0.2				0.7	0.2	1.6	5.5	1.0	0.1	6.6	24.2%	
	1981	0.3	0.2				0.8	0.1	1.4	6.0	1.0	0.0	7.0	20.0%	
	1982	0.8	0.1		0.1	0.4	0.5	0.1	2.0	6.0	1.0	0.0	7.0	28.6%	
	1983	0.1	0.2	0.1			0.6	0.1	1.1	6.8	0.0	0.1	6.9	15.9%	
	1984		0.1			0.2	0.6	0.5	1.4	6.7	0.1	0.6	7.4	18.9%	
	1985	0.1	0.1				0.6	0.2	1.0	7.2	0.1	0.1	7.4	13.5%	
	1986	0.2	0.2			0.5	0.9	0.0	1.8	7.7	0.1	0.0	7.8	23.1%	
	1987		0.2	(0.1)		0.3	1.1	0.2	1.7	8.3	0.0	0.1	8.4	20.2%	
	1988	0.1	0.1			0.7	1.5	0.2	2.6	9.7	0.0	0.1	9.8	26.5%	

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Statistical table 2 (continued)

OECD/DAC MEMBER COUNTRIES (Ranked by 1988 agencies as % of UNDP)	YEAR	UN SPECIALIZED AGENCIES							SUB- TOTAL	UNDP			SUB- TOTAL	AGENCY AS % OF UNDP SUB- TOTAL	a/ MSA
		FAO	WHO	UN	UNESCO	ILO	UNIDO	OTHER		CORE	ADMIN FUNDS	NON- CORE			
Australia	1979	0.3	0.2		0.1			0.1	0.7	7.7	0.0	0.1	7.8	9.0%	
	1980	0.8	0.3					1.3	2.4	8.1	0.0	0.0	8.1	29.6%	
	1981	0.6	0.5		0.1			0.6	1.8	11.3	0.1	0.1	11.5	15.7%	
	1982	2.5	0.5		0.1		0.4	1.2	4.7	14.6	2.1	0.7	17.4	27.0%	
	1983	1.6	1.1				0.3	1.1	4.1	13.9	1.0	0.8	15.7	26.1%	-----
	1984	2.4	1.5	0.3	0.1		0.1	1.2	5.6	13.4	0.0	0.7	14.1	39.7%	0.6
	1985	1.6	1.3				0.1	0.2	3.2	11.6	0.0	1.5	13.1	24.4%	0.9
	1986	1.3	0.2	0.3			0.2	1.9	3.9	8.5	0.1	0.7	9.3	41.9%	
	1987	0.5	1.1					0.4	2.0	10.7	0.1	0.3	11.1	18.0%	0.7
	1988	0.6	1.6					1.1	3.3	13.3	0.2	1.3	14.8	22.3%	0.8
United States	1979	1.2	2.9		0.5	0.2		2.3	7.1	126.0	2.5	0.2	128.7	5.5%	
	1980	5.0	2.7		0.3			3.6	11.6	126.1	2.3	0.1	128.5	9.0%	
	1981	3.7	4.9		0.4			4.0	13.0	125.8	2.4	1.0	129.2	10.1%	
	1982	1.1	3.2	0.6	1.3			3.0	9.2	128.2	2.2	0.2	130.6	7.0%	
	1983				0.4		0.1	2.0	2.5	139.3	2.2	1.1	142.6	1.8%	
	1984	0.1	2.8		1.4		0.4	2.6	7.3	158.7	2.2	0.7	161.6	4.5%	
	1985	0.1	3.7		1.0	0.2	0.2	3.1	8.3	161.4	2.6	2.7	166.7	5.0%	
	1986	3.7	8.8		0.8	0.1	0.6	2.4	16.4	138.1	1.2	2.6	141.9	11.6%	
	1987	0.9	12.4		0.2	0.2	0.4	4.0	18.1	107.5	1.2	1.7	110.4	16.4%	
	1988	2.7	16.0		1.3		0.2	3.3	23.5	110.0	1.3	3.7	115.0	20.4%	
Ireland	1979	0.1				0.2		(0.0)	0.3	1.4	0.0	0.0	1.4	21.4%	
	1980						0.1	0.0	0.1	1.3	0.0	0.0	1.3	7.7%	
	1981	1.0						0.2	1.2	1.2	0.0	0.0	1.2	100.0%	
	1982	0.6						0.0	0.6	1.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	60.0%	
	1983	0.1						0.0	0.1	1.1	0.0	0.0	1.1	9.1%	
	1984	0.1						0.0	0.1	1.1	0.0	0.0	1.1	9.1%	
	1985	0.1						0.0	0.1	1.1	0.0	0.0	1.1	9.1%	
	1986	0.1						0.0	0.1	1.5	0.0	0.0	1.5	6.7%	
	1987	0.1				0.1		0.1	0.3	1.3	0.0	0.0	1.3	23.1%	
	1988					0.1		0.0	0.1	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.5	20.0%	
France	1979	0.7	0.2	0.1	0.1		0.1	0.2	1.4	16.0	0.0	0.0	16.0	8.8%	
	1980	0.8	0.4		0.1		0.5	0.5	2.3	25.1	0.0	0.0	25.1	9.2%	
	1981	0.9	0.3	0.2	0.2		0.5	0.6	2.7	23.7	0.0	0.0	23.7	11.4%	
	1982	0.9		0.3	0.4		0.9	0.5	3.0	26.1	0.2	0.0	26.3	11.4%	
	1983	0.7	0.2	0.6	0.4		0.9	0.5	3.3	27.8	1.5	0.0	29.3	11.3%	-----
	1984	0.7	0.4	0.8	0.6		1.2	1.1	4.8	27.5	1.9	0.0	29.4	16.3%	
	1985	1.2	0.3	0.3	0.5		0.9	0.8	4.0	25.2	0.8	0.0	26.0	15.4%	
	1986	1.0	0.5	0.8	0.6		1.7	1.2	5.8	32.7	0.3	1.8	34.8	16.7%	
	1987	2.2	0.7	0.5	0.9	0.2	5.4	1.1	11.0	42.2	0.5	0.8	43.5	25.3%	
	1988	4.6	0.7	0.8	0.9	0.2	0.1	1.5	8.8	44.3	0.6	1.2	46.1	19.1%	0.7 0.5
New Zealand	1979							0.0		1.6	0.0	0.0	1.6	0.0%	
	1980							0.1	0.1	1.3	0.0	0.0	1.3	7.7%	
	1981							0.0	0.0	1.2	0.0	0.0	1.2	0.0%	
	1982							0.0	0.0	1.2	0.0	0.0	1.2	0.0%	
	1983							0.0	0.0	1.1	0.0	0.0	1.1	0.0%	
	1984							0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0%	
	1985							0.0	0.0	1.3	0.0	0.0	1.3	0.0%	
	1986							0.0	0.0	1.6	0.4	0.0	2.0	0.0%	
	1987							0.0	0.0	1.7	0.4	0.0	2.1	0.0%	
	1988	0.1	0.3					0.0	0.4	1.6	0.7	0.1	2.4	16.7%	
Spain	1979							0.1	0.1	0.8	0.0	0.0	0.8	12.5%	
	1980							0.1	0.1	1.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	10.0%	
	1981	0.1						0.1	0.2	1.1	0.1	0.0	1.2	16.7%	
	1982	0.1				0.1		0.2	0.4	1.2	0.1	0.0	1.3	30.8%	
	1983							0.3	0.3	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.4	75.0%	
	1984				0.2			0.7	0.9	2.6	0.0	0.1	2.7	33.3%	
	1985				0.6	0.1	0.1	(0.1)	0.7	2.7	0.0	0.1	2.8	25.0%	
	1986	0.4			0.2			0.6	1.2	3.8	0.0	0.3	4.1	29.3%	
	1987	0.9			0.2			0.1	1.2	4.8	0.0	0.0	4.8	25.0%	
	1988	0.1	0.2		0.2	0.1		0.2	0.8	5.7	0.0	0.2	5.9	13.6%	

Statistical table 2 (continued)

OECD/DAC MEMBER COUNTRIES (Ranked by 1988 agencies as % of UNDP)	YEAR	UN SPECIALIZED AGENCIES							SUB- TOTAL	UNDP			SUB- TOTAL	AGENCY AS % OF UNDP SUB- TOTAL	a/ MSA
		FAO	WHO	UN	UNESCO	ILO	UNIDO	OTHER		CORE	ADMIN FUNDS	NON- CORE			
Canada	1979	1.6	1.4					0.6	3.6	35.1	0.1	0.0	35.2	10.2%	
	1980	1.9			0.1			0.9	2.9	35.2	0.0	0.1	35.3	8.2%	
	1981	0.5	0.5					1.3	2.3	37.7	0.0	0.4	38.1	6.0%	
	1982	1.2	0.9	0.3	0.2			1.5	4.1	41.8	0.0	0.5	42.3	9.7%	
	1983	1.2	1.2		0.2	0.2		1.4	4.2	49.6	0.0	0.7	50.3	8.3%	
	1984	0.8	0.9		0.1			2.2	4.0	50.0	0.0	1.6	51.6	7.8%	
	1985	1.2	0.9		0.1			2.5	4.7	43.5	0.1	4.8	48.4	9.7%	
	1986	0.7	0.5	0.2	0.2	0.1		2.6	4.3	46.4	0.7	3.4	50.5	8.5%	
	1987	(0.1)	2.8		0.2			2.4	5.3	51.6	0.8	3.0	55.4	9.6%	
	1988	0.2	4.6		0.1			2.1	7.0	60.7	0.9	7.2	68.8	10.2%	
Subtotal OECD/DAC	1979	57.6	33.3	6.0	7.1	19.6	5.9	22.3	151.8	635.9	47.6	4.1	687.6	22.1%	
	1980	77.4	29.7	7.4	6.4	27.2	10.8	30.6	189.5	657.4	67.0	6.3	730.7	25.9%	
	1981	82.9	35.8	6.3	7.1	29.1	10.2	39.4	210.8	613.3	52.1	13.7	679.1	31.0%	
	1982	73.0	29.5	10.7	16.3	30.9	11.9	34.0	206.3	621.9	51.6	13.1	686.6	30.0%	
	1983	56.9	31.0	12.6	10.7	23.5	11.2	30.6	176.5	624.4	44.5	28.7	697.6	25.3%	
	1984	79.2	32.7	15.7	9.8	30.3	11.7	38.3	217.7	627.5	40.2	37.6	705.3	30.9%	0.6
	1985	49.5	32.4	8.0	9.6	27.5	10.4	36.6	174.0	624.2	39.7	67.4	731.3	23.8%	64.7
	1986	89.5	54.5	17.2	11.2	27.0	17.4	41.6	258.4	727.8	53.2	51.5	832.5	31.0%	57.5
	1987	79.3	72.7	9.9	12.3	48.7	43.8	50.7	317.4	821.9	59.8	47.5	929.2	34.2%	33.1
	1988	124.7	141.1	21.9	16.6	33.3	31.5	61.0	430.1	905.5	67.4	59.8	1,032.7	41.6%	18.1
SELECTED OTHER COUNTRIES		RANKED ON 1988 AGENCY SUBTOTAL													
Saudi Arabia	1984	42.0	0.2	0.1	1.8		1.0	21.3	66.4	3.5		7.0	10.5	632.4%	
	1985	11.7	1.3	(0.2)	1.0		1.0	9.1	23.9	3.5		8.8	12.3	194.3%	
	1986	21.9	0.9					4.2	27.0	3.5		9.1	12.6	214.3%	
	1987	12.1	1.0				1.0	9.4	23.5	3.5		8.3	11.8	199.2%	
	1988	11.7	1.7				1.0	9.8	24.2	3.5		4.8	8.3	291.6%	
Libya	1984	4.5	0.4		5.3	0.1	5.7	2.5	18.5			1.8	1.8	1027.8%	
	1985	0.3	0.5	(0.2)	2.7	(1.3)	9.7	2.6	14.3			1.5	1.5	953.3%	
	1986	1.5			1.6		5.2	0.9	9.2			1.4	1.4	657.1%	
	1987	0.6			0.5		2.1	0.6	3.8	0.5		3.0	3.5	108.6%	
	1988	0.1			3.5		5.2	1.4	10.2	1.0		2.9	3.9	261.5%	
Turkey	1984	1.0					0.2	0.0	1.2	1.2	0.2	0.8	2.2	54.5%	
	1985	0.6					0.2	0.1	0.9	1.0	0.2	0.4	1.6	56.3%	
	1986	0.9				0.2	0.2	0.0	1.3	0.8	0.1	0.3	1.2	108.3%	
	1987	3.5				0.4	0.2	0.1	4.2	0.8		0.3	1.1	381.8%	0.5
	1988	5.9				0.5	0.2	0.1	6.7	0.8		0.4	1.2	558.3%	0.9
Egypt	1984		1.1			0.5	0.5	0.0	2.1	0.7		0.2	0.9	233.3%	
	1985		1.2			0.3	0.7	0.1	2.3	0.7		1.0	1.7	135.3%	
	1986	0.1	1.8				0.3	(0.1)	2.1	0.7		1.0	1.7	123.5%	
	1987		1.3				0.1	0.4	1.8	0.4		1.1	1.5	120.0%	
	1988		1.9			0.4	2.8	0.1	5.2	0.2		0.4	0.6	866.7%	
United Republic of Tanzania	1984	3.9					0.0		3.9	0.1		0.0	0.1	3900.0%	
	1985	2.6					0.0		2.6	0.1		0.0	0.1	2600.0%	
	1986	4.1					0.0		4.1			0.0	0.0		
	1987	8.1					0.1		8.2			0.0	0.0		
	1988	3.5	0.1			0.2	(0.0)		3.8			0.0	0.0		
Brazil	1984	0.3				0.1		0.1	0.5	2.5		2.9	5.4	9.3%	
	1985					0.2		0.5	0.7	2.5		3.4	5.9	11.9%	
	1986	0.1				(0.1)		0.4	0.4	2.5		3.8	6.3	6.3%	
	1987	0.8						0.7	1.5	2.5		3.8	6.3	23.8%	0.2
	1988	1.7						0.7	2.4	2.5		7.5	10.0	24.0%	
India	1984	0.3	(0.1)		0.2		0.2	0.9	1.5	7.0		0.0	7.0	21.4%	
	1985	0.3		0.5	0.1		1.0	0.4	2.3	6.9		0.1	7.0	32.9%	
	1986	1.6		0.4	0.1		1.8	0.5	4.4	6.3		0.2	6.5	67.7%	
	1987	0.2	1.1		0.1		0.5	1.9		6.2		0.0	6.2	30.6%	
	1988	0.1	0.7		0.2		1.0	0.3	2.3	5.7		0.0	5.7	40.4%	
Pakistan	1984	2.8				0.2	0.1	0.2	3.3	1.8		0.0	1.8	183.3%	
	1985	0.5		0.1		0.1	0.1	0.6	1.4	1.6		0.4	2.0	70.0%	
	1986	2.0					0.1	0.2	2.3	1.5		0.3	1.8	127.8%	
	1987	3.4				0.6		0.1	4.1	1.5		0.0	1.5	273.3%	0.1
	1988	1.3				0.7		0.2	2.2	1.2		0.0	1.2	183.3%	

Statistical table 2 (continued)

SELECTED OTHER COUNTRIES (RANKED ON 1988 \$ SUB-TOTAL TO AGENCIES)	YEAR	UN SPECIALIZED AGENCIES							SUB-TOTAL	UNDP			SUB-TOTAL	AGENCY AS % OF UNDP SUB-TOTAL	a/ HSA
		FAO	WHO	UN	UNESCO	ILO	UNIDO	OTHER		CORE	ADMIN FUNDS	NON-CORE			
Argentina	1984							0.7	0.7	2.9		1.1	4.0	17.5%	
	1985						0.1	0.9	1.0	3.3		2.2	5.5	18.2%	
	1986						0.1	1.0	1.1	3.3		11.1	14.4	7.6%	
	1987						0.1	1.4	1.5			12.7	12.7	11.8%	6.0
	1988							1.8	1.8			17.0	17.0	10.6%	7.0
Cameroon	1984							0.8	0.8	0.4		0.1	0.5	160.0%	
	1985							1.3	1.3	0.1	0.1	1.3	1.5	86.7%	
	1986		0.1			0.1		0.6	0.8	0.1		1.1	1.2	66.7%	
	1987					0.6		1.2	1.8			0.0	0.0	a/	
	1988					1.0		0.7	1.7			1.1	1.1	154.5%	
Democratic Yemen	1984	1.3				0.7		0.0	2.0			0.5	0.5	400.0%	
	1985	1.8				0.1		(0.0)	1.9			0.2	0.2	950.0%	
	1986	0.9				0.2		(0.1)	1.0			0.2	0.2	500.0%	
	1987	2.0				0.4		(0.1)	2.3			0.2	0.2	1150.0%	
	1988	1.7						0.0	1.7			0.0	0.0	0.0%	
Mexico	1984	0.5			0.1	0.1	0.1	0.3	1.1	1.0		1.0	2.0	55.0%	
	1985	0.9						0.0	0.9	0.9	0.2	0.9	2.0	45.0%	
	1986	0.1						0.1	0.2	0.3		0.3	0.6	33.3%	
	1987	1.5						0.2	1.7	0.1		0.3	0.4	425.0%	
	1988	1.4						0.3	1.7	0.0		1.0	1.0	170.0%	
Sudan	1984	0.4						0.1	0.5			0.3	0.3	166.7%	
	1985	1.8				1.6		(0.0)	3.4			0.2	0.2	1700.0%	
	1986					1.2		0.0	1.2			0.7	0.7	171.4%	
	1987	0.2	0.1			1.2		0.0	1.5			0.0	0.0	a/	
	1988	0.6	0.1			0.8		0.0	1.5			0.0	0.0	a/	
Bolivia	1984							0.0		0.1		0.7	0.8	a/	
	1985							0.0				1.9	1.9	a/	
	1986							0.0		0.1		5.9	6.0	a/	
	1987							0.0		0.1		3.8	3.9	a/	
	1988							1.3	1.3	0.1		2.8	2.9	44.8%	3.1
Kuwait	1984	(1.1)	0.6				0.1	0.1	(0.3)			1.5	1.5	-20.0%	
	1985	0.5	0.3			0.1	0.1	0.1	1.1			1.5	1.5	73.3%	
	1986	1.9	0.1		0.2			(0.1)	2.1			1.9	1.9	110.5%	
	1987	1.1	0.1		0.1			0.3	1.6			1.7	1.7	94.1%	
	1988	0.6			0.1	0.1		0.1	0.9			2.1	2.1	42.9%	
Gabon	1984					0.2		0.0	0.2			2.1	2.1	9.5%	
	1985	0.7				0.1		(0.1)	0.7			2.6	2.6	26.9%	
	1986	0.5				0.1		0.0	0.6	0.2		3.3	3.5	17.1%	
	1987	0.5						0.0	0.5	0.3		(0.6)	(0.3)	-166.7%	
	1988	0.6				0.1		0.0	0.7			1.6	1.6	43.8%	
China	1984	0.2	0.2				0.4	0.1	0.9	1.8	0.2	2.5	4.5	20.0%	
	1985						0.7	0.7	1.4	1.9	0.1	1.7	3.7	37.8%	
	1986	0.1	0.2				0.4	0.4	1.1	2.0	0.1	4.0	6.1	18.0%	
	1987		0.2				0.4	0.3	0.9	2.2	0.4	2.3	4.9	18.4%	
	1988		0.1					0.5	0.6	2.4	0.1	2.2	4.7	12.8%	
Zambia	1984	2.3	0.1	0.1		0.2		0.2	2.9	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.4	725.0%	
	1985	0.7				0.4		0.1	1.2	0.1			0.1	1200.0%	
	1986	0.9						0.0	0.9	0.0			0.0	0.0%	
	1987	1.7				0.4		0.0	2.1	0.1			0.1	2100.0%	
	1988	0.5						0.0	0.5	0.1			0.1	500.0%	
Venezuela	1984				0.1			0.0	0.1	1.1		1.3	2.4	4.2%	
	1985				0.1	(0.2)		0.0	0.0	1.1		1.5	2.6	a/	
	1986							0.0		0.9		1.1	2.0	a/	
	1987				0.2			0.0	0.2	0.9		1.0	1.9	10.5%	
	1988				0.3			0.1	0.4	0.9		1.6	2.5	16.0%	
Indonesia	1984	0.2						0.5	0.7	2.8		2.9	5.7	12.3%	
	1985					0.1		0.3	0.4	2.8		1.3	4.3	9.3%	
	1986	0.1				0.3		0.2	0.6	2.8		2.5	5.3	11.3%	
	1987							0.1	0.1	1.1		3.3	4.4	2.3%	0.4
	1988	0.2				0.2		0.0	0.4	1.1		11.4	12.5	3.2%	

Statistical table 2 (continued)

SELECTED OTHER COUNTRIES (RANKED ON 1988 \$ SUB-TOTAL TO AGENCIES)	YEAR	UN SPECIALIZED AGENCIES							SUB-TOTAL	UNDP			SUB-TOTAL	AGENCY AS % OF UNDP SUB-TOTAL	a/ MSA
		FAO	WHO	UN	UNESCO	ILO	UNIDC	OTHER		CORE	ADMIN FUNDS	NON-CORE			
Colombia	1984							0.0		1.3		1.6	2.9	a/	
	1985							0.0		1.3		2.2	3.5	a/	
	1986							0.0		1.3		2.3	3.6	a/	
	1987							0.0		1.3		1.9	3.2	a/	
	1988							0.3	0.3	1.4		3.8	5.2	5.8%	
Trinidad and Tobago	1984							0.0		0.2		2.2	2.4	a/	
	1985							0.0		0.2		1.6	1.8	a/	
	1986	0.2						0.0	0.2			1.4	1.4	14.3%	
	1987							0.1	0.1			1.3	1.3	7.7%	
	1988					0.1		0.1	0.2			1.9	1.9	10.5%	
Ecuador	1984							0.1	0.1	0.5		0.8	1.3	7.7%	
	1985							0.1	0.1	0.5		0.9	1.4	7.1%	
	1986							0.2	0.2	0.5		3.5	4.0	5.0%	
	1987							0.3	0.3	0.5		4.3	4.8	6.3%	0.4
	1988							0.1	0.1	0.5		2.9	3.4	2.9%	0.9
Algeria	1984							0.0		0.8		1.1	1.9	b/	
	1985						0.1	0.0	0.1	0.8		1.8	2.6	3.8%	
	1986				0.1			0.0	0.1	0.8		1.6	2.4	4.2%	
	1987							0.1	0.1	0.5		1.9	2.4	4.2%	
	1988							0.0		0.5		1.0	1.5	b/	
Honduras	1984							0.0		0.1		1.6	1.7	b/	
	1985							0.0		0.1		2.1	2.2	b/	
	1986							0.1	0.1	0.1		1.6	1.7	5.9%	
	1987							0.2	0.2	0.1		1.9	2.0	10.0%	
	1988							0.0				1.5	1.5	b/	0.2
Subtotal selected other countries	1984	58.6	2.5	0.2	7.5	2.1	8.3	27.9	107.1	30.0	0.5	34.1	64.6	165.8%	0.0
	1985	22.4	3.3	0.2	3.9	1.5	13.7	16.9	61.9	29.4	0.6	39.7	69.7	88.8%	0.0
	1986	36.9	3.1	0.4	2.0	2.0	8.1	8.5	61.0	27.7	0.2	58.6	86.5	70.5%	0.0
	1987	35.7	3.8	0.0	0.9	3.6	3.9	16.0	63.9	22.6	0.4	52.5	75.5	84.6%	7.6
	1988	29.9	4.6	0.0	4.1	4.1	10.2	17.9	70.8	21.9	0.1	67.9	89.9	78.8%	12.1
Others	1984	6.0	6.1	1.1	2.1	3.2	3.8	4.7	27.0	21.3	(0.5)	56.4	77.2	35.0%	0.5
	1985	9.0	5.5	1.1	2.2	3.1	3.2	7.3	31.4	18.8	4.8	47.4	71.0	44.2%	0.5
	1986	5.6	5.9	1.8	0.0	5.2	2.8	6.0	27.3	19.9	3.6	39.8	63.3	43.1%	1.1
	1987	4.5	5.0	(0.4)	1.1	3.0	3.5	5.5	22.2	20.3	0.8	48.1	69.2	32.1%	4.6
	1988	5.2	6.2	0.2	1.1	3.5	4.0	10.8	31.0	20.8	0.1	82.5	103.4	30.0%	7.2
TOTAL	1979	81.0	38.2	6.3	29.5	24.6	14.1	36.3	230.0	697.2	47.6	51.3	796.1	28.9%	
	1980	95.5	32.6	11.4	22.5	37.3	18.7	55.9	273.9	716.8	67.0	66.4	850.2	32.2%	
	1981	116.8	45.4	7.6	41.9	43.1	19.6	64.0	338.4	673.8	52.1	71.4	797.3	42.4%	
	1982	110.4	40.4	11.6	39.2	44.5	18.7	71.1	335.9	675.8	51.6	78.4	805.8	41.7%	
	1983	92.1	43.7	13.9	18.4	31.2	21.2	61.6	282.1	675.7	44.5	135.9	856.1	33.0%	
	1984	143.8	41.3	17.0	19.4	35.6	23.8	70.9	351.8	678.8	40.2	128.1	847.1	41.5%	1.1
	1985	80.9	41.2	9.3	15.7	32.1	27.3	60.8	267.3	672.4	45.1	154.5	872.0	30.7%	65.2
	1986	132.0	63.5	19.4	13.2	34.2	28.3	56.1	346.7	775.4	57.0	149.9	982.3	35.3%	58.6
	1987	119.5	81.5	9.5	14.3	55.3	51.2	72.2	403.5	864.8	61.0	148.1	1,073.9	37.6%	45.3
	1988	159.8	151.9	22.1	21.8	40.9	45.7	89.7	531.9	948.2	67.6	210.2	1,226.0	43.4%	37.4

Source: UN System Regular and Extrabudgetary Technical Co-operation Expenditure Documents for the years 1979-1988.

a/ Management services agreement.

b/ Infinity.

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Statistical table 3. Agency expenditures by source, 1988

(Thousands of United States dollars)

I. AFRICA

Regular Budget	COUNTRY LEVEL EXPENDITURES (BY AGENCY)	UNFPA et al a/	Multi. Fin. Ins.	Donor trust funds	Recipient trust funds	Sub-Total	U N D P			Grand Total	Share of Grand Total a/	UNDP as % of Grand Total
							Central	Admin Funds	Sub-Total			
8958	FAO	1786	5446	35145	6469	48846	69090	5587	74677	123523	29.2%	60.5%
	UN	10890		1470		12360	42830	2439	45269	57629	13.6%	78.6%
801	ILO	2218	208	9826	3400	15652	25910	1246	27156	42808	10.1%	63.4%
	UNDP/OPS	528				528	15046	26407	41453	41981	9.9%	98.7%
	GOVERNMENTS	1544				1544	17713	12320	30033	31577	7.5%	95.1%
23857	WHO	2064		16271	510	18845	2461	2461	2461	21306	5.0%	11.6%
586	UNIDO	1270		2547		3817	16452	18	16470	20287	4.8%	81.2%
1603	UNESCO	3726	1202	3883		8811	8485	22	8507	17318	4.1%	49.1%
	IBRD					0	12214	388	12602	12602	3.0%	100.0%
	ICAO	30		96	81	207	8362	92	8454	8661	2.0%	97.6%
78	WMO			4400		4400	3662		3662	8062	1.9%	45.4%
234	ITU		220	1758	716	2694	5349		5349	8043	1.9%	66.5%
	ITC			3279	103	3382	3276		3276	6658	1.6%	49.2%
	UNFPA	5140				5140			0	5140	1.2%	0.0%
	UNV					0	4847		4847	4847	1.1%	100.0%
46	UNCHS			46	5	51	3910	603	4513	4564	1.1%	98.9%
	IMO	65	352	1034	56	1507	232		232	1739	0.4%	13.3%
	UNICEF	99				99		1481	1481	1580	0.4%	93.7%
	UNCTAD			30		30	1185		1185	1215	0.3%	97.5%
170	UPU	217		78		295	846		846	1141	0.3%	74.1%
3333	IAEA			370		370	482		482	852	0.2%	56.6%
	OTHERS	652		303		955	258		258	1213	0.3%	21.3%
39666	SUB-TOTAL	30229	7428	80536	11340	129533	242610	50603	293213	422746	100.0%	69.4%

Regular Budget	REGIONAL LEVEL EXPENDITURES (BY AGENCY)	UNFPA et al	Multi. Fin. Ins.	Donor trust funds	Recipient trust funds	Sub-Total	U N D P			Grand Total	Share of Grand Total a/	UNDP as % of Grand Total
							Central	Admin Funds	Sub-Total			
13289	WHO	1483		32863		34346	705		705	35051	25.6%	2.0%
1676	FAO	295	416	13724		14435	3706	62	3768	18203	13.3%	20.7%
	IBRD					0	12618	523	13141	13141	9.6%	100.0%
	Reg. Comm.	3709				3709	6546		6546	10255	7.5%	63.8%
	UNDP/OPS					0	7377	2171	9548	9548	7.0%	100.0%
112	UN	6664		74		6738	855		855	7593	5.6%	11.3%
1906	ILO	589	250	5220		6059	1361		1361	7420	5.4%	18.3%
433	UNESCO	530		3451		3981	2928		2928	6909	5.1%	42.4%
14	ITU			1357		1357	3280		3280	4637	3.4%	70.7%
64	WMO			2336		2336	1936		1936	4272	3.1%	45.3%
	ICAO					0	3990		3990	3990	2.9%	100.0%
920	UNIDO	10		1977		1987	1225	62	1287	3274	2.4%	39.3%
	UNCTAD					0	2654		2654	2654	1.9%	100.0%
	ITC			492		492	1926		1926	2418	1.8%	79.7%
	NGO	1796				1796		45	45	1841	1.3%	2.4%
	GOVERNMENTS					0	1135	274	1409	1409	1.0%	100.0%
999	IMO	89		23		112	1203		1203	1315	1.0%	91.5%
	OTHERS	615		355		970	1768	19	1787	2757	2.0%	64.8%
19413	SUB-TOTAL	15780	666	61872		78318	55213	3156	58369	136687	100.0%	42.7%
59079	GRAND TOTAL	46009	8094	142408	11340	207851	297823	53759	351582	559633		

Statistical table 3 (continued)

II. ASIA

Regular Budget	COUNTRY LEVEL EXPENDITURES (BY AGENCY)	UNFPA et al	Multi Fin. Ins	Donor trust funds	Recipient trust funds	Sub-Total	U N D P Central	Admin Funds	Sub-Total	Grand Total	Share of Grand Total	UNDP as % of Grand Total
5916	FAO	211	748	7370	2115	10444	44606	687	45293	55737	16.8%	81.3%
274	UNIDO	547		4155		4702	35782	23	35805	40507	12.2%	88.4%
	GOVERNMENTS	8943		198		9141	24784	3334	28118	37259	11.2%	75.5%
29	UN	4319		590	242	5151	26371	358	26729	31880	9.6%	83.8%
	UNDP/OPS	1999				1999	17646	4248	21894	23893	7.2%	91.6%
902	ILO	2045	188	3073	1761	7067	16137	479	16616	23683	7.1%	70.2%
22584	WHO	5405		8953	1375	15733	5035		5035	20768	6.3%	24.2%
	IBRD					0	17706		17706	17706	5.3%	100.0%
11	UNFPA	14350				14350			0	14350	4.3%	0.0%
	ICAO			82	3000	3082	9867		9867	12949	3.9%	76.2%
652	UNESCO	560	112	2691		3363	9504		9504	12867	3.9%	73.9%
	NGOS	6947				6947	63	90	153	7100	2.1%	2.2%
	ASDB					0	6949		6949	6949	2.1%	100.0%
	UNCHS			68		68	4988		4988	5056	1.5%	98.7%
	ITC			2219		2219	1877		1877	4096	1.2%	45.8%
63	ITU			3	20	23	3893		3893	3916	1.2%	99.4%
56	WHO			1000		1000	2216		2216	3216	1.0%	68.9%
4651	IAEA			1554	59	1613	1369		1369	2982	0.9%	45.9%
	UNV					0	2596		2596	2596	0.8%	100.0%
46	UNICEF	46		295		46	693	1222	1222	1268	0.4%	96.4%
	IMO		173	90	51	468	1141		693	1161	0.4%	59.7%
84	OTHERS	105				246			1141	1387	0.4%	82.3%
35268	SUB-TOTAL	45477	1221	32341	8623	87662	233223	10441	243664	331326	100.0%	73.5%

Regular Budget	REGIONAL LEVEL EXPENDITURES (BY AGENCY)	UNFPA et al	Multi Fin. Ins	Donor trust funds	Recipient trust funds	Sub-Total	U N D P Central	Admin Funds	Sub-Total	Grand Total	Share of Grand Total	UNDP as % of Grand Total
399	FAO	235	1499	4529		6263	8161	25	8186	14449	20.2%	56.7%
12158	WHO	1053		5465		6518	2310		2310	8828	12.4%	26.2%
	Reg. Comm.	1472				1472	6703		6703	8175	11.4%	82.0%
	UN	-7		5541		5534	696		696	6230	8.7%	11.2%
	UNDP/OPS	137				137	3345	1252	4597	4734	6.6%	97.1%
402	UNESCO	854		1731		2585	1430		1430	4015	5.6%	35.6%
	GOVERNMENTS	1178				1178	2774		2774	3952	5.5%	70.2%
2523	ILO	737		1543		2280	1464	13	1477	3757	5.3%	39.3%
	ICAO					0	2889		2889	2889	4.0%	100.0%
	ITC			350		350	2489		2489	2839	4.0%	87.7%
	ITU			320		320	1542		1542	1862	2.6%	82.8%
78	UNIDO			842		842	856	27	883	1725	2.4%	51.2%
	UNCTAD			131		131	1048	100	1148	1279	1.8%	89.8%
878	IAEA			607		607	654		654	1261	1.8%	51.9%
	IBRD					0	1229		1229	1229	1.7%	100.0%
	IMO		15	66		81	1012		1012	1093	1.5%	92.6%
148	OTHERS	186		170		356	2749	27	2776	3132	4.4%	88.6%
16576	SUB-TOTAL	5845	1514	21295		28654	41351	1444	42795	71449	100.0%	59.9%
51844	GRAND TOTAL	51322	2735	53636	8623	116316	274574	11885	286459	402775		

Statistical table 3 (continued)

III. LATIN AMERICA

Regular Budget	COUNTRY LEVEL EXPENDITURES (BY AGENCY)	UNFPA et al a/	Multi Fin. Ins	Donor trust funds	Recipient trust funds	Sub-Total	U N D P			Grand Total	Share of Grand Total %	UNDP as % of Grand Total
							Central	Admin Funds	Sub-Total			
5016	Governments	1654				1654	42366	1848	44214	45868	27.7%	96.4%
	FAO	101	342	3964	4443	8850	10036	40	10076	18926	11.4%	53.2%
	UNDP/OPS					0	8402	6828	15230	15230	9.2%	100.0%
119	UN	1751		403		2154	9913	2	9915	12069	7.3%	82.2%
7786	ITU			32	4920	4952	5943		5943	10895	6.6%	54.5%
3	WHO	6015		3548		9563	813		813	10376	6.3%	7.8%
791	UNIDO	298		1031	8	1337	7882	6	7888	9225	5.6%	85.5%
42	ILO	488		678	476	1642	6297		6297	7939	4.8%	79.3%
904	ICAO				193	193	6771		6771	6964	4.2%	97.2%
113	UNCHS			106		106	5147		5147	5253	3.2%	98.0%
	UNESCO	616		1475	162	2253	2079		2079	4332	2.6%	48.0%
	WMO			1524		1524	2172		2172	3696	2.2%	58.8%
	UNFPA	2549				2549			0	2549	1.5%	0.0%
	Reg. Comm.			1243	1249	2492			0	2492	1.5%	0.0%
4327	IBRD	9				9	2434	9	2443	2432	1.5%	99.6%
	IAEA			1235	3	1238	669	16	685	1923	1.2%	35.6%
	ITC			855		855	549		549	1404	0.8%	39.1%
	UNCTAD					0	1054		1054	1054	0.6%	100.0%
98	OTHERS	161	96	315	186	758	1531	399	1930	2688	1.6%	71.8%
19199	SUB-TOTAL	13642	438	16409	11640	42129	114058	9148	123206	165335	100.0%	74.5%

Regular Budget	REGIONAL LEVEL EXPENDITURES (BY AGENCY)	UNFPA et al	Multi Fin. Ins	Donor trust funds	Recipient trust funds	Sub-Total	U N D P			Grand Total	Share of Grand Total %	UNDP as % of Grand Total
							Central	Admin Funds	Sub-Total			
826	Reg. Comm.	2046		3309		5355	1909		1909	7264	18.4%	26.3%
10834	FAO	401	242	5303		5946	84		84	6030	15.3%	1.4%
2535	WHO	1372		2989		4361	674		674	5035	12.7%	13.4%
288	ILO	181	291	2642		3114	583		583	3697	9.4%	15.8%
	UNESCO	572		1148		1720	1455		1455	3175	8.0%	45.8%
	UNDP/OPS					0	2554	438	2992	2992	7.6%	100.0%
	GOVERNMENTS	95				95	1523		1523	1618	4.1%	94.1%
1	IBRD					0	1182	420	1602	1602	4.1%	100.0%
49	UN			127		127	1000		1000	1127	2.9%	88.7%
114	UNIDO			619		619	496		496	1115	2.8%	44.5%
1330	WMO			207		207	763		763	970	2.5%	78.7%
124	IAEA	-29		919		890		-16	-16	874	2.2%	-1.8%
	OTHERS	877		1599		2476	1528	36	1564	4040	10.2%	38.7%
16101	SUB-TOTAL	5515	533	18862		24910	13751	878	14629	39539	100.0%	37.0%
35300	GRAND TOTAL	19157	971	35271	11640	67039	127809	10026	137835	204874		

Statistical table 3 (continued)

IV.A. ARAB STATES

Regular Budget	COUNTRY LEVEL EXPENDITURES (BY AGENCY)	UNFPA et al a/	Multi Fin. Ins	Donor trust funds	Recipient trust funds	Sub-Total	U N O P Central	Admin Funds	Sub-Total	Grand Total	Share of Grand Total a/	UNDP as % of Grand Total
3215	FAO	276	2114	5467	13344	21201	11797	1144	12941	34142	24.7%	37.9%
169	UNIDO	903		520	8118	9541	10519		10519	20060	14.5%	52.4%
	UN	2978		204	275	3457	10700	407	11107	14564	10.5%	76.3%
	ICAO				10491	10491	3696		3696	14187	10.3%	26.1%
8958	WHO	1112		3863	3829	8804	1269	50	1319	10123	7.3%	13.0%
438	UNESCO	1418	266	651	3913	6248	2878		2878	9126	6.6%	31.5%
326	ILO	815	132	2421	1650	5018	3520		3520	8538	6.2%	41.2%
	UNDP/OPS	10				10	3330	3313	6643	6653	4.8%	99.8%
	GOVERNMENTS	1349				1349	2957	1109	4066	5415	3.9%	75.1%
	UNFPA	2750				2750			0	2750	2.0%	0.0%
31	WHO			195	560	755	1631		1631	2386	1.7%	68.4%
10	UNCHS	51		109	37	197	1700	11	1711	1908	1.4%	89.7%
	ITC			248	118	366	1246		1246	1612	1.2%	77.3%
117	ITU			38		38	1364		1364	1402	1.0%	97.3%
	IBRD					0	1362		1362	1362	1.0%	100.0%
2763	IAEA			993	16	1009	197		197	1206	0.9%	16.3%
51	OTHERS	73	27	156	146	402	2392		2392	2794	2.0%	85.6%
16078	SUB-TOTAL	11735	2539	14865	42497	71636	60558	6034	66592	138228	100.0%	48.2%

Regular Budget	REGIONAL LEVEL EXPENDITURES (BY AGENCY)	UNFPA et al a/	Multi Fin. Ins	Donor trust funds	Recipient trust funds	Sub-Total	U N O P Central	Admin Funds	Sub-Total	Grand Total	Share of Grand Total a/	UNDP as % of Grand Total
17594	WHO	2517		2858		5375	602		602	5977	29.1%	10.1%
410	FAO	1	629	587		1217	3365		3365	4582	22.3%	73.4%
	IMO	407				407	954		954	1361	6.6%	70.1%
	UNDP/OPS	60				60	1244	24	1268	1328	6.5%	95.5%
	Reg. Comm.	631				631	509		509	1140	5.5%	44.6%
393	UNESCO	448	39	320		807	190		190	997	4.9%	19.1%
248	ILO	350	3			353	462		462	815	4.0%	56.7%
588	OTHERS	678		543		1221	3114	7	3121	4342	21.1%	71.9%
19233	SUB-TOTAL	5092	671	4308		10071	10440	31	10471	20542	100.0%	51.0%
35311	GRAND TOTAL	16827	3210	19173	42497	81707	70998	6065	77063	158770		

IV.B. EUROPE

Regular Budget	COUNTRY LEVEL EXPENDITURES (BY AGENCY)	UNFPA et al a/	Multi Fin. Ins	Donor trust funds	Recipient trust funds	Sub-Total	U N O P Central	Admin Funds	Sub-Total	Grand Total	Share of Grand Total a/	UNDP as % of Grand Total
498	FAO				5840	5840	2233		2233	8073	35.2%	27.7%
36	UNIDO	704		40	5	749	3057		3057	3806	16.6%	80.3%
25	WHO	358		21		379	1368		1368	1747	7.6%	78.3%
	UN	742				742	982		982	1724	7.5%	57.0%
247	UNESCO			37		37	1188		1188	1225	5.3%	97.0%
3370	IAEA			1051	18	1069	55		55	1124	4.9%	4.9%
147	ILO	17		37		54	432		432	486	2.1%	88.9%
157	OTHERS	364	14	520	558	1456	3220	61	3281	4737	20.7%	69.3%
4480	TOTAL b/	2185	14	1706	6421	10326	12535	61	12596	22922	100.0%	55.0%

a/ Excluding the agency's regular budget.

b/ Regional level expenditures are included in Arab States' regional figures.

Statistical table 3 (continued)

V. INTERREGIONAL/GLOBAL

Regular Budget	EXPENDITURES (BY AGENCY)	UNFPA et al a/	Multi Fin. Ins	Donor trust funds	Recipient trust funds	Sub- Total	U N D P			Grand Total	Share of Grand Totala/	UNDP as % of Grand Total
							Central	Admin Funds	Sub- Total			
61106	WHO	15431		97040		112471	5649	243	5892	118363	47.7%	9.0%
	FAO	1693	8930	20604		31227	1551	-10	1541	32768	13.2%	4.7%
	UNDP/DPS					0	17540	4946	22486	22486	9.1%	100.0%
398	UNIDO	122		15608		15730	8	873	881	16611	6.7%	5.3%
915	UNESCO	4279	559	6061		10899			0	10899	4.4%	0.0%
	IBRD					0	6674	3742	10416	10416	4.2%	100.0%
	ITC			7493		7493	1293		1293	8786	3.5%	14.7%
	NGOS	6622				6622		70	70	6692	2.7%	1.0%
1374	ILO	1294		3732		5026	830		830	5856	2.4%	14.2%
7117	UN	3350		849		4199	491	-10	481	4680	1.9%	10.3%
	IMD			4326		4326	150		150	4476	1.8%	3.4%
	UNCTAD			1071		1071	769	714	1483	2554	1.0%	58.1%
3166	UNFPA	2014				2014			0	2014	0.8%	0.0%
481	IAEA			523		523			0	523	0.2%	0.0%
	OTHERS	29		507		536	315	346	661	1197	0.5%	55.2%
74557	TOTAL	34834	9489	157814	0	202137	35270	10914	46184	248321	100.0%	18.6%

a/ Largely UNFPA funds plus those of UNICEF and NGOs.

Statistical table 4. Summary of agency expenditures by source, ranked by country-level grand total, 1988

(Millions of United States dollars)

Regular Budget	AGENCY		UNFPA GL a/	Multi. Fin. Ins	Donor trust funds	Recipient trust funds	Sub- Total a/	U N O P			Grand Total	UNDP as % of Grand Total
								Central	Admin. Funds	Sub- Total b/		
23.6	FAO	C L g/	2.4	8.7	51.9	32.2	95.2	137.8	7.5	145.2	240.4	60.4%
3.3		R L d/	0.9	2.8	24.1		27.8	15.3	0.1	15.4	43.2	35.6%
		G L e/	1.7	8.9	20.6		31.2	1.6	-0.0	1.5	32.8	4.7%
26.9		Sub-Total	5.0	20.4	96.7	32.2	154.2	154.6	7.5	162.2	316.4	51.3%
	GOVERNMENTS	C L	13.5		0.2		13.7	87.8	18.6	106.4	120.1	88.6%
		R L	1.3				1.3	5.4	0.3	5.7	7.0	81.8%
		Sub-Total	14.8		0.2		15.0	93.3	18.9	112.1	127.1	88.2%
0.0	UN	C L	20.7		2.7	0.5	23.9	90.8	3.2	94.0	117.9	79.8%
0.1		R L	6.7		5.7		12.4	2.6		2.6	15.0	17.1%
7.1		G L	3.4		0.8		4.2	0.5	-0.0	0.5	4.7	10.3%
7.3		Sub-Total	30.7		9.3	0.5	40.5	93.8	3.2	97.0	137.5	70.6%
1.1	UNIDO	C L	3.7		8.3	8.1	20.1	73.7	0.0	73.7	93.9	78.5%
1.0		R L	0.0		3.4		3.4	2.6	0.1	2.7	6.1	43.6%
0.4		G L	0.1		15.6		15.7	0.0	0.9	0.9	16.6	5.3%
2.5		Sub-Total	3.9		27.3	8.1	39.3	76.3	1.0	77.3	116.6	66.3%
	UNDP/CPS	C L	2.5				2.5	44.4	40.8	85.2	87.8	97.1%
		R L	0.2				0.2	14.5	3.9	18.4	18.6	98.9%
		G L						17.5	4.9	22.5	22.5	100.0%
		Sub-Total	2.7				2.7	76.5	49.6	126.1	128.8	97.9%
3.0	ILO	C L	5.6	0.5	16.0	7.3	29.4	52.3	1.7	54.0	83.4	64.7%
7.2		R L	1.9	0.5	9.4		11.8	3.9	0.0	3.9	15.7	24.7%
1.4		G L	1.3		3.7		5.0	0.8		0.8	5.9	14.2%
11.6		Sub-Total	8.8	1.1	29.2	7.3	46.3	57.0	1.7	58.7	105.0	55.9%
63.2	WHO	C L	15.0		32.7	5.7	53.3	10.9	0.1	11.0	64.3	17.1%
53.9		R L	6.4		44.2		50.6	4.3		4.3	54.9	7.8%
61.1		G L	15.4		97.0		112.5	5.6	0.2	5.9	118.4	5.0%
178.2		Sub-Total	36.8		173.9	5.7	216.4	20.9	0.3	21.2	237.6	8.9%
3.8	UNESCO	C L	6.3	1.6	8.7	4.1	20.7	24.1	0.0	24.2	44.9	53.8%
1.5		R L	2.4	0.0	6.7		9.1	6.0		6.0	15.1	39.8%
0.9		G L	4.3	0.6	6.1		10.9				10.9	10.0%
6.3		Sub-Total	13.0	2.2	21.4	4.1	40.7	30.1	0.0	30.2	70.9	42.6%
	ICAO	C L	0.0		0.2	13.8	14.0	28.7	0.1	28.8	42.8	67.3%
		R L						6.9		6.9	6.9	100.0%
		Sub-Total	0.0		0.2	13.8	14.0	35.6	0.1	35.7	49.6	71.9%
	IBRD	C L	0.0				0.0	33.7	0.4	34.1	34.1	100.0%
		R L						15.0	0.9	16.0	16.0	100.0%
		G L						6.7	3.7	10.4	10.4	100.0%
		Sub-Total	0.0				0.0	55.4	5.1	60.5	60.5	100.0%
0.0	UNFPA	C L	24.8				24.8				24.8	0.0%
		R L										
		G L	2.0				2.0				2.0	0.0%
0.0		Sub-Total	26.8				26.8				26.8	0.0%
0.5	ITU	C L		0.2	1.8	5.7	7.7	16.5		16.5	24.3	68.2%
0.0		R L			1.7		1.7	4.8		4.8	6.5	76.2%
		G L										
0.5		Sub-Total		0.2	3.5	5.7	9.4	21.4		21.4	30.8	69.5%
0.3	IAHO	C L			7.1	0.6	7.7	9.7		9.7	17.4	55.8%
0.2		R L			2.5		2.5	2.7		2.7	5.2	51.5%
		G L										
0.5		Sub-Total			9.7	0.6	10.2	12.4		12.4	22.6	54.8%
0.1	UNCHS	C L	0.1		0.3	0.0	0.4	15.7	0.6	16.4	16.8	97.5%
		R L										
		G L										
0.1		Sub-Total	0.1		0.3	0.0	0.4	15.7	0.6	16.4	16.8	97.5%
	ITC	C L			6.6	0.2	6.8	6.9		6.9	13.8	50.5%
		R L			0.8		0.8	4.4		4.4	5.3	84.0%
		G L			7.5		7.5	1.3		1.3	8.8	14.7%
		Sub-Total			14.9	0.2	15.2	12.7		12.7	27.8	45.5%

Statistical table 4 (continued)

(Ranked on CL Grand Total)

Regular Budget	AGENCY	UNFPA et al	Multi. Fin. Ins	Donor trust funds	Recipient trust funds	Sub- Total a/	U N D P			Grand Total	UNDP as % of Grand Total
							Central	Admin. Funds	Sub- Total b/		
18.4	IAEA	C L		5.2	0.1	5.3	2.8	0.0	2.8	8.1	34.5%
2.2		R L	-0.0	1.5		1.5	0.7	-0.0	0.6	2.1	29.9%
3.2		G L		0.5		0.5				0.5	0.0%
23.8		Sub-Total	-0.0	7.3	0.1	7.3	3.4	0.0	3.4	10.7	31.9%
	UNV	C L					7.4		7.4	7.4	100.0%
		R L									
		G L									
		Sub-Total					7.4		7.4	7.4	100.0%
	NGOS	C L	6.9			6.9	0.1	0.1	0.2	7.1	2.2%
		R L	1.8			1.8		0.0	0.0	1.8	2.4%
		G L	6.6			6.6		0.1	0.1	6.7	1.0%
		Sub-Total	15.4			15.4	0.1	0.2	0.3	15.6	1.7%
	ASDI	C L					6.9		6.9	6.9	100.0%
		R L									
		G L									
		Sub-Total					6.9		6.9	6.9	100.0%
	IMO	C L	0.1	0.5	1.3	2.0	0.9		0.9	2.9	31.9%
		R L	0.5	0.0	0.1	0.6	3.2		3.2	3.8	84.1%
		G L			4.3	4.3	0.2		0.2	4.5	3.4%
		Sub-Total	0.6	0.5	5.7	6.9	4.2		4.2	11.1	38.1%
0.0	UNICEF	C L	0.1			0.1		2.7	2.7	2.8	94.9%
		R L									
		G L									
0.0		Sub-Total	0.1			0.1		2.7	2.7	2.8	94.9%
	Reg. Comm.	C L		1.2	1.2	2.5				2.5	0.0%
		R L	7.9	3.3		11.2	15.7		15.7	26.8	58.4%
		G L									
		Sub-Total	7.9	4.6	1.2	13.7	15.7		15.7	29.3	53.4%
	UNCTAD	C L		0.0		0.0	2.2		2.2	2.3	98.7%
		R L		0.1		0.1	3.7	0.1	3.8	3.9	96.7%
		G L		1.1		1.1	0.8	0.7	1.5	2.6	58.1%
		Sub-Total		1.2		1.2	6.7	0.8	7.5	8.8	85.9%
0.2	UPU	C L	0.2	0.1		0.3	0.8		0.8	1.1	74.1%
		R L									
		G L									
0.2		Sub-Total	0.2	0.1		0.3	0.8		0.8	1.1	74.1%
0.4	OTHERS	C L	1.4	0.1	1.4	3.8	8.5	0.5	9.0	12.8	70.2%
1.9		R L	2.4		2.7	5.0	9.2	0.1	9.2	14.3	64.8%
0.5		G L	0.0		0.5	0.5	0.3	0.3	0.7	1.2	55.2%
2.7		Sub-Total	3.7	0.1	4.6	9.4	18.0	0.9	18.9	28.3	66.9%
114.7	TOTAL)	C L	103.3	11.6	145.9	80.5	663.0	76.3	739.2	1080.5	68.4%
71.3		R L	32.2	3.4	106.3	141.9	120.8	5.5	126.3	268.2	47.1%
74.6		G L	34.8	9.5	157.8	202.1	35.3	10.9	46.2	248.3	18.6%
260.6	GRAND TOTAL		170.3	24.5	410.0	80.5	819.0	92.7	911.7	1597.0	57.1%

a/ Largely UNFPA funds and those of UNICEF and NGOs.

b/ Excluding the agency's regular budget.

c/ C L = Country level expenditures.

d/ R L = Regional level expenditures.

e/ G L = Global level expenditures.

0.0 = Figures less than \$100,000.